SWEENEY, J.
This is a medical malpractice case. Susan Drozdowski claims she suffered significant emotional distress as the result of medical negligence by Dr. Donald Chilson. Dr. Chilson performed a radiofrequency ablation procedure on Ms. Drozdowski to treat cardiac arrhythmia. The question before us is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting evidence of other personal problems which arguably contributed to Ms. Drozdowski's anxiety but were not related to the medical procedure and its sequela. We conclude the judge did not abuse his discretion and affirm the judgment in favor of Dr. Chilson.
FACTS
In May 1991, Dr. Donald Chilson performed a radiofrequency ablation procedure on Susan Drozdowski to treat her cardiac arrhythmia. In April 1994, Ms. Drozdowski sued Dr. Chilson for medical negligence. She claimed that Dr. Chilson did not properly monitor her heart and failed to timely respond to critical changes in her heart. Because of all of this, she now needs a pacemaker and this causes her emotional distress.
Ms. Drozdowski moved in limine to exclude evidence of certain personal issues, including a 1996 divorce and child custody dispute, her ex-husband's drinking, her addiction to pain medications in 1995, and the fact that her three children had different fathers. She also argued that evidence of her dental problems and a burn injury was not relevant.
The trial judge ruled the evidence was admissible if it was shown to have a `logical nexus' to the emotional distress damages. But he required that Dr. Chilson show the relationship.
During opening statements, Ms. Drozdowski's attorney told the jury that Ms. Drozdowski's life became `an open book' after she filed the lawsuit. Her attorney then talked about Ms. Drozdowski's 1993 auto accident, anxiety condition, abuse of pain medication, and her `somewhat ugly' divorce. During trial, Ms. Drozdowski affirmatively raised the evidence of her personal issues. Dr. Chilson addressed each in cross-examination. Ms. Drozdowski testified that she did not blame Dr. Chilson for all of the `stressors' in her life. But the `stressors,' including the results of her heart procedure, caused her to feel hopeless.
The jury found that Dr. Chilson was not negligent. The court denied Ms. Drozdowski's motion for new trial.
DISCUSSION
We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Garcia v. Providence Med. Ctr., 60 Wn. App. 635, 642, 806 P.2d 766 (1991). The trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Id.
Here, Dr. Chilson argued for the introduction of these personal issues to show that Ms. Drozdowski's emotional distress resulted from other events in her life rather than the ablation procedure. And it was for this precise reason the court tentatively ruled the evidence would be admissible if there was a logical relationship between her anxiety and these other sources of stress. That is not an abuse of discretion. The relationship between Ms. Drozdowski's claimed damages and the liability-producing event — medical negligence — was a tenable ground for the ruling.
We believe there was no error for three reasons:
(1) Ms. Drozdowski introduced evidence on each of these personal problems, not the defendant. Any error was therefore invited. City of Bellevue v. Kravik,
69 Wn. App. 735, 739-40,
850 P.2d 559 (1993).
(2) The evidence of significant sources of anxiety in her life was admissible through Ms. Drozdowski's testimony about her `stressors.' It was relevant to the question of proximate cause and damages. Dr. Chilson, assuming he was negligent, would not be responsible for anxiety caused by events other than his medical procedure.
(3) Finally, and most significantly, assuming there was error, it was harmless because the jury found in favor of Dr. Chilson and never reached the questions of proximate cause or damages. Kimball v. Otis Elevator Co.,
89 Wn. App. 169, 174-75,
947 P.2d 1275 (1997).
We affirm the judgment in favor of Dr. Chilson.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Sweeney, J.
WE CONCUR: Brown, A.C.J., Schultheis, J.