LYNN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On this date came before the Court for consideration the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") on July 19, 1999, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his constitutional due process rights. Plaintiff's claims against DISD for breach of contract and against Co-Defendant Ron Price for defamation are not the subject of the Motion to Dismiss. DISD asserts that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted and that the § 1983 claim should thus be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff Bobby Coleman ("Coleman") filed his Original Complaint on May 14, 1999. DISD moved to dismiss, simultaneously with answering. Plaintiff has not responded to DISD's Motion to Dismiss.
Coleman alleges that he was a sergeant in DISD's security officer unit. He claims he was terminated for alleged "good cause," but that "good cause" did not in fact exist. He alleges that he had various disputes with his supervisor, for which he was put on probation, then recommended for termination. He claims that various allegations were raised against him in the termination hearing, without prior notice to him, and he was then terminated.
This Court should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is clear, as a matter of law, that under no set of facts consistent with the allegations could relief be granted. Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim for relief under § 1983. No custom or policy actually or constructively known to members of DISD's Board of Trustees, which custom or policy was the moving force behind a constitutional violation, has been alleged. Such an allegation is required to state a § 1983 claim. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dept., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997). Further, such an allegation must be non-conclusory, and must contain specific facts. Plaintiff could not recover under the allegations as pleaded for a violation of § 1983.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 claim is granted. The § 1983 claim is thus dismissed, without prejudice. Defendant has twenty days from the date of this Order to replead, to attempt to state a § 1983 claim if he believes he can do so.
SO ORDERED.