SIMANDLE, District Judge:
Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for reconsideration/reargument pursuant to L. Civ.R. 7.1(g) of this Court's Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. As explained in the Court's Opinion dated March 13, 2000, plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether racial animus motivated the Sheriff Department's decision not to promote Mr. Daisey to the rank of Lieutenant. Daisey v. Sheriff Gill, et al., Slip Op. at 20, 98-CV-3820 (JBS), (D.N.J. March 13, 2000). Plaintiff now moves this Court to reconsider its decision on the basis of "an erroneous factual foundation." (Pl. Br. at 1.)
A. Reargument Standards
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) requires that a motion for reargument shall be served within 10 days of the entry of the order or judgment on which reargument is sought. Such motions should be accompanied by a "brief setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge or Magistrate has overlooked." Id. "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision, and `recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.'" Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991) (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)). As this Court has stated, "motions for reargument succeed only where a `dispositive factual matter or controlling decision of law' was presented to the Court but not considered." Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987). Where no facts or cases were overlooked, such a motion will be denied, Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat. Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988); Resorts International v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992).
If the record was inadequately developed on a particular issue, the court has discretion to reconsider the matter, Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Corp., 849 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.N.J. 1994), but not to the extent of considering new evidence that was available but not submitted while the motion was pending. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988). In other words, a "motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or to present evidence which should have been raised before." Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856-67 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). As the late Chief Judge Gerry noted, "we are in fact bound not to consider such new materials, lest the strictures of our reconsideration rule erode entirely." Resorts International, 830 F. Supp. at 831 n. 3 (Emphasis in original). Consequently, only when the matters overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion if the court had considered them will the court entertain such a motion. Panna, 760 F. Supp. at 435.
B. Analysis
Here, plaintiff argues that the Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants was incorrect, and disagrees with the Court's assessment of the evidence. As grounds for this argument, plaintiff repeatedly characterizes this Court's findings as "inaccurate", or "incorrect", but has failed to point to specific facts that the Court overlooked. Because plaintiff has failed to point to controlling facts or law which the Court overlooked, his motion for reargument will be denied.
Plaintiff correctly points out that the Court mistakenly headed section C.2 of its discussion of the case "Legitimate Reasons for Dismissal." (Pl. Br. at 3.) As is apparent from the rest of this Court's Opinion, this case arises from an allegedly discriminatory refusal to promote, thus this mis-heading is immaterial.
Plaintiff's brief demonstrates his straightforward disagreement with the Court's assessment of whether defendants had come up with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Daisey. The Court found in its March 13, 2000 Opinion that they had done so. Plaintiff contests this finding in part by pointing out that the Court cited to three disciplinary incidents that occurred after Daisey's non-promotion. While this may be true, the Court's finding of legitimate reasons for non-dismissal is amply supported by the other four instances of misconduct warnings that occurred prior to the non-promotion. (See Pl. Br. at 3 (citing warnings).) The Court finds that there was and is ample evidence in the record to compel the conclusion that defendants had come forward with legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Daisey's non-promotion. Moreover, plaintiff still has not pointed to any evidence that would cast doubt on these proffered legitimate reasons. It is, of course, plaintiff's burden at this stage of the analysis of a summary judgment motion to come forth with some evidence, or inferences from evidence, from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants' proffered reasons for non-promotion were a pretext for discrimination.Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1056-72 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). As this Court previously stated in the Opinion of March 13, 2000, citing Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1072, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment at this stage if the plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to rebut the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory explanation for the unfavorable employment action, and plaintiff's failure to show pretext was the main reason the Court granted summary judgment against plaintiff.
The remainder of plaintiff's brief is but a recapitulation of the evidence that was before the Court originally. Plaintiff sets forth an unavailing collection of disagreements with the Court's findings and conclusions based upon the evidence of record. However, the law is clear that simple disagreement is not sufficient grounds to successfully move a Court to reconsider a previous judgment. Plaintiff's brief does not point to any information which the Court had before it but did not consider, and has pointed to no controlling law that the Court overlooked. It is manifest that plaintiff here is simply asking the Court to rethink its original decision. As plaintiff's motion advances nothing more than a straightforward disagreement with this Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants, plaintiff must present such arguments via the normal appellate process, not on a motion for reargument. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for reargument will be denied. The accompanying Order is entered.
O R D E R
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on plaintiff's motion for reargument pursuant to L. Civ.R. 7.1(g) of this Court's Opinion and Order in this case dated March 13, 2000; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons discussed in today's Opinion;
IT IS this day of June, 2000
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration/reargument be, and hereby is, DENIED .