PITTMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Jeremiah Robinson was found guilty in the Hinds County Circuit Court of two counts of uttering forgery and sentenced to twelve years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections on each count, with said sentences to run consecutively to any other sentences. He appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. We subsequently granted certiorari to consider the issues. Because the trial court did not make the required on-the-record factual determinations regarding Robinson's Batson objections, Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), we remand this case to the circuit court in order to conduct a proper Batson hearing.
FACTS
¶ 2. In August 1994, Gus Primos, owner of Lakeland Development, agreed to make a campaign contribution to a candidate running for sheriff. Jeremiah Robinson went to the offices of Lakeland Development to collect the campaign contribution. Upon Robinson's arrival, Primos's personal secretary left Primos's checkbook on her desk while she obtained his signature on the contribution check. Primos signed the check and personally delivered it to Robinson.
¶ 3. When Lakeland Development received its monthly bank statement, it was discovered that two out-of-sequence checks had been written on the account. Further inquiry revealed that both checks had been made out to Robinson and cashed by him at two local bank branches in the Jackson area. Robinson was subsequently indicted and convicted of two counts of uttering forgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed Robinson's convictions, and this Court subsequently granted his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
ANALYSIS
¶ 4. Robinson asserts that the trial court did not make an on-the-record factual determination and inquiry regarding his Batson objections, and therefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with prior published decisions of this Court. Specifically, he argues that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with Hatten v. State , 628 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1993) and Puckett v. State , 737 So.2d 322 (Miss. 1999).
¶ 5. In Hatten , we stated:
This Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether a trial judge is required to make an on-the-record factual determination of race neutral reasons cited by the State for striking veniremen from a panel. The
Batson Court declined to provide specific guidelines for handling this issue. This Court has articulated the general law in this state which provides that "it is the duty of the trial court to determine whether purposeful discrimination has been shown," by the use of peremptory challenges.
Wheeler v. State ,
536 So.2d 1347 (Miss. 1988);
Lockett v. State , 517 So.2d at 1349.
In considering this issue, we today decide it necessary that trial courts make an on-the-record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State for its use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors. This requirement is to be prospective in nature. Of course, such a requirement is far from revolutionary, as it has always been the wiser approach for trial courts to follow. Such a procedure, we believe, is in line with the "great deference" customarily afforded a trial court's determination of such issues. "Great deference" has been defined in the
Batson context as insulating from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous.
Lockett v. State , 517 So.2d at 1349-50.
Accord
Willie v. State ,
585 So.2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991);
Benson v. State ,
551 So.2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1989);
Davis v. State ,
551 So.2d 165, 171 (Miss. 1989),
cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1074,
110 S.Ct. 1796,
108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990);
Chisolm v. State ,
529 So.2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1988);
Johnson v. State ,
529 So.2d 577, 583-84 (Miss. 1988). Obviously, where a trial court offers clear factual findings relative to its decision to accept the State's reason[s] for peremptory strikes, the guesswork surrounding the trial court's ruling is eliminated upon appeal of a
Batson issue to this Court.
Hatten ,
628 So.2d at 298.
¶ 6. In Puckett v. State , 737 So.2d 322 (Miss. 1999), we stated:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination using the
Batson criteria, a white defendant must show that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges on persons of race and that the circumstances give rise to the inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges in order to strike minorities.
Bush v. State ,
585 So.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Miss. 1991).
Therefore, before the trial court is required to conduct a
Batson hearing, it must first be shown that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination exists. Specifically, Puckett must show that the
State used peremptory challenges on black jurors in such a manner that gave rise to an inference of purposeful racial discrimination. However, it should be noted here that the State did not wait for a Batson challenge, but provided reasons for striking all jurors regardless of race or gender. Nonetheless, this voluntary action on the State's behalf should not be interpreted as eliminating Puckett's burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Upon review, this Court "must first . . . determine that the circumstances of the State's use of peremptory challenges against minority venirepersons created an inference of purposeful discrimination."
Thorson v. State ,
653 So.2d 876, 898 (Miss. 1994) (Smith, J. dissenting).
If the trial court does make the determination that the defendant has properly established this inference, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each challenged peremptory strike. The defense must then provide rebuttal to the State's proffered reasons. The trial judge must then "make an on-the-record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State for its use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors."
Hatten v. State ,
628 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1993).
Puckett ,
737 So.2d at 334-35.
¶ 7. We went on to hold in Puckett :
The inference of purposeful discrimination was not automatically invoked in this case. The trial judge did not make a ruling that Puckett had established this inference. The trial judge did not make on-the-record factual determinations and inquiry independently as required by
Hatten regarding each peremptory challenge. We therefore remand this issue for a properly conducted
Batson hearing in accordance with this opinion.
Id. at 337.
¶ 8. In the present case, the Court of Appeals found:
We must note that the trial court is experienced in conducting voir dire and having observed the demeanor of these four prospective jurors during the voir dire proceedings was in the best posture to decide whether these reasons given by the State were legitimate rather than pretextual. This Court has held that a circuit court's decision in this matter is entitled to great deference. We will reverse the circuit court's
Batson findings only where those findings are clearly erroneous and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Lockett v. State ,
517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss. 1987). "Finally, the trial court must make a finding of fact to determine if the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination. If the defendant makes no rebuttal the trial judge must base his decision only on the reasons given by the State."
Berry v. State ,
703 So.2d 269, 294 (Miss. 1997) (citations omitted). As stated in
Davis v. State ,
551 So.2d 165, 172 (Miss. 1989), when defense counsel only alleges in general terms that peremptory strikes amount to
Batson violations and there is no actual proffer of evidence concerning such violation, this Court is limited in its ability to reverse on this point. In the case at bar, counsel for Robinson only argued in general terms and, therefore, this Court is limited in its ability to reverse.
While the record fails to reflect the racial composition of the jury, we are cognizant of, 591 So.2d 428, 430 (Miss. 1991), by which the Mississippi Supreme Court Govan v. State announced:
The mere fact that a jury is white does not violate
Batson ; rather it is the racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to strike jurors from the jury that violates the
Batson rule.
Suddeth v. State ,
562 So.2d 67, 71 (Miss. 1990).
The record reflects that the judge had a hearing and required the prosecution to state race neutral reasons for the State's
peremptory strikes and the prosecution was forthcoming with such reasons. The judge held that the State's reasons were racially neutral and accepted the representations of the prosecution as an officer of the court. The record does not reveal that the peremptory strikes were used in such a way as to violate the
Batson rule. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
Robinson v. State , No. 97-KA-01288-COA,
___ So.2d ___,
1999 WL 367153 (Miss. Ct. App. June 8, 1999).
¶ 9. The record in the present case shows the following exchange took place during jury selection:
MR. DE GRUY [attorney for Robinson]: Your Honor, we make a Batson objection at this time. The State has exercised all five challenges against African-Americans, and we ask that they bring forward race neutral reasons.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BUCKLEY [for the State]: Your Honor, Lawrence Jones, Panel 1, No. 3, was sleeping during Court's instructions and during voir dire. I never saw him raise up. I couldn't tell if he was awake or what was going on with him.
Number two, Rhonda Johnson. She was inattentive and failed to make eye contact with me and would never nod one way or another in this manner.
Number three, Floyd Tate. He teaches political science and sociology. We didn't want him getting back in the jury room and explaining things in a sociological manner to the jury in any way. In fact, Gracie White and Alma Irving, both of them were inattentive. Especially, Mrs. Irving. I could not get her to make eye contact with me in any way.
Gracie White was not responsive to any questions, and it was as if I wasn't even speaking. And I chose to strike them for those reasons, Your Honor.
MR. DE GRUY: Your Honor, we would object to all of those reasons. The law is now clear in Mississippi if they are going to base their strikes on things like sleeping, inattentive, no eye contact, the Court has to make a factual finding that those things are, in fact, true. We would ask the Court to make that determination that Mr. Jones was, in fact, sleeping.
THE COURT: Well, it would be virtually impossible for the Court to tell whether or not someone was making eye contact with someone else. I mean, that would be — —
MR. DE GRUY: I think if you can't make a factual finding that [sic] the strike cannot be allowed.
THE COURT: I find that they would be racially neutral reasons and the Court will accept the representations of the officer of the court.
¶ 10. It is clear from the record that the trial court did not make the necessary findings as required by Hatten and Puckett . Further, the record shows that defense counsel specifically requested the Court to make such findings. We therefore remand this case to the Hinds County Circuit Court to conduct a proper Batson hearing pursuant to Hatten and Puckett .
CONCLUSION
¶ 11. Because the trial court failed to make the necessary on-the-record findings required by Hatten and Puckett , we remand this case to the circuit court to conduct a proper Batson hearing.
¶ 12. REMANDED. PRATHER, C.J., BANKS, P.J., McRAE AND WALLER, JJ. CONCUR. MILLS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH AND COBB, JJ. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.