DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, and a new trial is granted on the issue of liability only, with costs to abide the event. The findings of fact as to damages as modified by the order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, and as, on the plaintiff's consent, modified by reducing the damages for future medical expenses from $40,000 to $7,500, are affirmed.
The plaintiff, an employee of the third-party defendant S J Vending, was injured when the truck in which he was a passenger was struck by a bus owned by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA) and operated by its employee, the defendant Raul Allen. The truck was driven by the third-party defendant Brian Rauchfuss, another employee of S J Vending. The plaintiff was ejected from the truck and suffered, inter alia, head and shoulder injuries.
At trial, the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to introduce the finding, made in the NYCTA arbitration proceeding, that Allen was "going much too fast" at the time of the accident. Prior to the admission of this evidence, a witness for the NYCTA testified, outside the presence of the jury, that this finding was based on Rule 85, an internal NYCTA standard, which focused on the preventability of accidents, and was based on a higher standard of care than reasonable care.
The admission into evidence of the arbitrator's finding was error because it was based on the NYCTA rule which imposed a higher duty than the duty to exercise reasonable care that the NYCTA actually owed to the plaintiff (see, Crosland v. New York City Tr. Auth., 68 N.Y.2d 165, 168-169; see also, Hines v. New York City Tr. Auth., 264 A.D.2d 506; Conrad v. County of Westchester, 259 A.D.2d 724). In view of the evidence that the truck pulled into a traffic lane in front of the bus, and that the bus was travelling at a speed of less than 20 miles per hour, the error was prejudicial, and a new trial on the issue of liability is therefore required.
Contrary to the contention of the third-party defendant Rauchfuss, the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff for future pain and suffering does not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see, CPLR 5501[c]). We note that the plaintiff, on appeal, consented to reduce the amount of damages for future medical expenses from $40,000 to $7,500 based on the evidence adduced at the trial. The findings of fact as to damages, as modified by the Supreme Court and the plaintiff's concession, are affirmed.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.