The motion court correctly denied the motion to intervene because the proposed intervenor was a stranger to the subject insurance agreement and therefore had no right to enforce the insurer's obligation, until a judgment against the insured was rendered and remained unsatisfied (see, Insurance Law § 3420(b)(1); Abdalla v. El Emeri Yehia, 246 A.D.2d 373; Clarendon Place Corp. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 182 A.D.2d 6, 9, appeal dismissed and lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 918).
Since appellant is without standing to intervene in this action, it follows that she may not claim to be aggrieved, within the meaning of CPLR 5511, by determinations made in the action other than the denial of her motion for intervention, and, accordingly, that she has no standing to appeal from such other determinations.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.