MARTIN, District Judge.
Olga Browne, a dietician employed at the Bronx Psychiatric Hospital, brings this action for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that she has been discriminated against for over twenty years because she is a black Panamanian.
Under the familiar burden-shifting framework for analyzing summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) her job performance was satisfactory; (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) the adverse employment decision occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). In addition, before bringing a civil action, the employee must pursue available administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the New York State Division of Human Rights, and the discriminatory action must have occurred within 300 days of the filing of the administrative charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights on July 9, 1996. Thus, any claims relating to incidents that occurred prior to September 1995 are time-barred.
While Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for promotion on numerous occasions over the years, there have been no vacancies in a position to which Plaintiff could be promoted since 1987. Thus, any claim that Plaintiff was discriminated against when she was denied promotion is time-barred.
The only other events to which Plaintiff referred in her administrative charge are not actionable because they do not amount to adverse employment actions. See Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997). First, Plaintiff contends that she was improperly directed to prepare an initial nutritional evaluation of a patient well after the time such initial evaluations should have been prepared. However, this did not in any way impact the conditions of Plaintiff's employment.
Similarly, Plaintiff's complaints about the way that her employer responded to her charges at an administrative hearing did not affect the conditions of her employment. Finally, her complaints about the preparation of her employee evaluation in 1999 do not indicate that she suffered any adverse consequence therefrom.
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.