DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The timely filing of a notice of claim was a condition precedent to the commencement of a tort action against the New York City Transit Authority and Jason E. Schoolfield (see, Public Authorities Law § 1212). The plaintiffs' failure to satisfy that condition requires dismissal of the first cause of action insofar as asserted against those defendants (see, Perry v. City of New York, 238 A.D.2d 326).
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, an injured party's disability does not toll the 90-day notice of claim period, only the time in which to apply for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, Russo v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 344, 348; Matter of Butler v. Town of Ramapo, 242 A.D.2d 570; Matter of Purdy v. Afton Cent. School Dist., 202 A.D.2d 776). Here, any disability ceased, at the latest, on August 26, 1994, when the injured party died. An application for leave to serve a late notice of claim for conscious pain and suffering was not made within one year and 90 days of that date (see, General Municipal Law § 50-i[c]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court lacked the power to extend the time to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc (see, Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950 supra; Hey v. Town of Napoli, 265 A.D.2d 803; Perry v. City of New York, supra, at 327; Myrick v. County of Suffolk, 139 A.D.2d 633, 635).