DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The showup procedure utilized in this case was not impermissibly suggestive, since "the record discloses that [it] was conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the offense and to the subsequent apprehension of the defendant" (People v. Sanchez, 178 A.D.2d 567, 568; see also, People v. Bunker, 259 A.D.2d 757).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's credibility by questioning him about his prior convictions, while prohibiting any questioning about the facts underlying these convictions (see, People v. Ricks, 135 A.D.2d 844). Use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is not automatically precluded because the crimes charged are similar to the prior convictions (see, People v. McBride, 255 A.D.2d 459), or because the prior convictions are remote in time (see, People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he unlawfully entered the building (see, Matterof Ryan R., 254 A.D.2d 49) while harboring an intent to commit a crime therein (see, People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).