DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that his right against self-incrimination was violated is without merit. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's decision to terminate his polygraph examination, which was undertaken after he was advised of and effectively waived his Miranda rights (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436), did not demonstrate an unequivocal and unqualified desire to assert his right to remain silent so as to render his subsequent questioning unlawful (see, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96; People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, cert denied 472 U.S. 1007; People v. Morton, 231 A.D.2d 927). Further, the polygraph examination did not constitute coercion. A confession made following voluntary participation in a polygraph examination is admissible where, as here, the circumstances indicate that the confession was not coerced (see, People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.