SMITH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. This case arises out of a written contract under which Quality Farms, Inc. was to provide garbage collection services for Wilkinson County. Quality Farms appealed to the Wilkinson County Circuit Court from the denial of its claim against the Wilkinson County Board of Supervisors for additional services rendered to the county during the term of the contract. At the initial hearing the circuit court remanded the matter to the Board of Supervisors for additional consideration. The Board again denied the claim, and Quality Farms appealed the decision to the circuit court. At a final hearing the circuit court found that the claim should be satisfied to the extent of $9,000. The Board of Supervisors appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the Wilkinson County Circuit Court and denied the Board's Motion for Rehearing on October 26, 1999. We granted the Board's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 10, 2000.
¶ 2. We find that no proper bill of exceptions was filed in the circuit court so as to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court in this matter. As a result, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reverse the circuit court's judgment, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Court's decision in Reed v. Adams , 236 Miss. 333, 111 So.2d 222 (1959).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶ 3. The Wilkinson County Board of Supervisors entered into a contract with Quality Farms, Inc., for residential garbage collection within the county over a twenty-four month period to begin on December 7, 1992. Under the terms of the contract, Quality Farms was to submit its bill to the County by the 24th of each month. The base rate of the contract for the first year was $16,500 per month for service to 2,750 households, and $6 per household for each additional household. For the second year, the rate would be the same with the base number of households raised to 3,000. The contract also stated that the County would be responsible for determining what constituted a "household" and for collecting the fees, while Quality Farms was to assist the billing clerk in identifying the number of households serviced.
¶ 4. Over the two-year term of the contract, Quality Farms submitted its requests for payment of the monthly base rate. On December 30, 1994, Quality Farms submitted an additional invoice to cover the costs of servicing the additional households-$18,000 for the first year for servicing an additional 250 households per month, and $9,000 for the second year for servicing an additional 125 households per month. The Board of Supervisors rejected this bill, and Quality Farms appealed to the Wilkinson County Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the matter to the Board for reconsideration, stating that the record was unclear as to whether Quality Farms was entitled to the additional payment.
¶ 5. On remand, the Board reviewed its clerk's billing records and a revised statement from Quality Farms. The figures showed that Quality Farms serviced an additional 170 households per month over the course of the two-year contract, rather than the 250 households per month initially claimed by Quality Farms for the first year and 125 households for the second year. The Board again denied Quality Farms' claim on the basis that the bill for additional services was not submitted with the original invoices in accordance with the terms of the contract.
¶ 6. The circuit court thereafter held its final hearing on the matter and denied Quality Farms' claim of additional compensation for the first year of the contract based upon the untimeliness of the claim. The circuit court awarded Quality Farms the $9,000 for the second-year service to additional households, finding that the invoice was timely submitted within thirty days of the contract's end. Although the records indicated that Quality Farms might otherwise be entitled to $12,240 for the additional 170 households per month serviced during the second year, the circuit court found that Quality Farms' recovery was limited to the $9,000 amount charged in the December 30, 1994, invoice.
¶ 7. The Board of Supervisors appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment as being supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Wilkinson County Bd. of Supervisors v. Quality Farms, Inc ., No. 98-CA-00752-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Presiding Judge King, joined by Judge Payne, dissented, rejecting the majority's position that Quality Farms timely submitted its invoice for the second-year additional households. Presiding Judge Southwick, joined by Chief Judge McMillin and Presiding Judge King, also wrote a dissent expressing his opinion that the timeliness of the claim was irrelevant, because no proper bill of exceptions was ever presented to the circuit court, and that the circuit court's reversal of the Board's decision was based upon evidence not in the record. The Board timely filed in this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted on February 10, 2000.
STATEMENT OF THE LAW I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYED AN IMPROPER STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW IN THIS CASE.
¶ 8. The Board asserts that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review in this case. The Court of Appeals, citing Barnes v. Board of Supervisors, 553 So.2d 508, 510-11 (Miss. 1989), declared that the level of review in an appeal from an adjudicative action of a board of supervisors is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board maintains that the actions of a board of supervisors may not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly shown that its actions were arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without a substantial evidentiary basis. We recently addressed the proper standard of review in appeals from a circuit court's review of a municipal authority's decision in Hooks v. George County , 748 So.2d 678 (Miss. 1999):
The standard of review for this case is substantial evidence, the same standard which applies in appeals from decisions of administrative agencies and boards.
Barnes v. Board of Supervisors ,
553 So.2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1989). "The decision of an administrative agency is not to be disturbed unless the agency order was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency's scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party."
Board of Law Enforcement Officers Standards Training v. Butler ,
672 So.2d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 1996). Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" or to put it simply, more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence.
Johnson v. Ferguson ,
435 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1983).
Hooks ,
748 So.2d at 680. Contrary to this well-settled standard of review, the Board maintains that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals reapplied the burden of proof facing Quality Farms in its presentation before the Board of Supervisors, thereby substituting their judgment for that of the Board.
¶ 9. The Court of Appeals misconstrued this Court's opinion in Barnes and applied an inappropriate standard of review. In Barnes , we distinguished other appeals from zoning decisions by municipalities, being legislative acts, and declared that in appeals from adjudicative decisions:
[T]he burden is upon the applicants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they have met the elements/factors essential to obtaining the conditional use permit. If the Board's decision is founded upon
substantial evidence, then it is binding upon an appellate court, i.e., the Circuit Court and this Court.
This is the same standard of review which applies in appeals from decisions of other administrative agencies and boards.
Barnes ,
553 So.2d at 511 (emphasis added). As pointed out above, we applied our
Barnes decision in
Hooks and held that the appropriate standard of review was substantial evidence, the same standard as applies in appeals from administrative agencies, which requires a finding that the board's decision was "unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the agency's scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party" before it may be overturned on appeal.
Hooks ,
748 So.2d at 680.
¶ 10. The Board is correct that the Court of Appeals improperly reviewed the Board's decision based upon the preponderance of the evidence standard which should only be employed by the Board itself in reviewing the claim before it. Although the second issue raised by the Board is controlling in this case, we address this issue to clarify the appropriate standard of review in an appeal from an adjudicative action of a board of supervisors.
II. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO EXISTING MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT CASE LAW, IN FINDING THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT CONSIDER EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY BEFORE IT. ¶ 11. The Board also asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the circuit court's judgment, because the circuit court considered evidence outside of the bill of exceptions. In Hooks , we reiterated the premise in question:
In an appeal from the decision of a municipal authority, Miss. Code Ann. §
11-51-75 (1972) states that the person aggrieved may "embody the facts, judgment and decision in a bill of exceptions" which will be transmitted to the circuit court acting as an appellate court. Miss. Code Ann. §
11-51-75 (1972). The bill of exceptions serves as the record on appeal, and we have held that "[t]he circuit court can only consider the case as made by the bill of exceptions. This is the only record before the circuit court, as an appellate court."
Stewart v. City of Pascagoula ,
206 So.2d 325, 328 (Miss. 1968).
Hooks ,
748 So.2d at 680.
¶ 12. Specifically, the Board points to the circuit court's finding that an average of 2,920 customers were billed per month by the Board during the contract term. The Court of Appeals majority conceded that this information was not contained in the bill of exceptions or the amended bill of exceptions. However, they held that the circuit court was allowed to consider the record made before the Board on remand, including a statement by counsel for Quality Farms indicating that the average county billing was 2,920 per month. In so holding, the Court of Appeals pointed to this Court's decision in Thornton v. Wayne County Election Comm'n , 272 So.2d 298, 301 (Miss. 1973). Therein, this Court stated:
The circuit court reviews the record made before the board, of the testimony made or proferred [sic], to determine whether or not the acts and orders of the board are reasonable and proper or arbitrary or capricious or beyond the power of the board to make or whether they violate any constitutional right of the complaining party. . . .
We have repeatedly held that an appeal from a board of supervisors or city by a bill of exceptions, as is provided by Section 1195, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1972), is an appeal to an appellate court and the circuit court is bound by the record made before the board.
Thornton ,
272 So.2d at 301. Section
11-51-75, governing appeals from municipal authority judgments, requires that the circuit court shall decide such a case "as presented by the bill of exceptions as an appellate court. . ." Miss. Code Ann. §
11-51-75 (1972). The statute also provides that the appealing party "may embody the facts, judgment and decision in a bill of exceptions which shall be signed by the person acting as president of the board of supervisors or of the municipal authorities."
Id .
¶ 13. We find that the language in Thornton indicating that the circuit court may review testimony from the board hearing is limited to such testimony as has been included in the bill of exceptions. This reading is consistent with the dictates of § 11-51-75 and other case law of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. Hooks , 748 So.2d at 680; Cox v. Board of Supervisors of Madison County , 290 So.2d 629, 630 (Miss. 1974); Stewart v. City of Pascagoula , 206 So.2d 325, 328 (Miss. 1968); East Neshoba Vocational High Sch. Bonds v. Board of Supervisors , 213 Miss. 146, 151, 56 So.2d 394, 396 (1952); Hall v. Franklin County , 184 Miss. 77, 185 So. 591, 594 (1939); City of Greenwood v. Henderson , 84 Miss. 802, 37 So. 745, 745-46 (1905); Van Meter v. City of Greenwood , 724 So.2d 925, 928 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). As Judge Southwick pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the average monthly number of households billed by the county, whatever its relevance, the invoices submitted by Quality Farms, and the computer printout of disbursements by the county were not made a part of the bill of exceptions or the amended bill of exceptions. Therefore, they should not have been considered by the circuit court.
¶ 14. Moreover, as Judge Southwick stated the amended bill of exceptions was not signed by the board president, so it was not properly presented in this case.
The general rule with respect to bills of exceptions when presented to the proper official for signature appears to be that such officer or official cannot arbitrarily refuse to sign and return the bill of exceptions merely because he deems the same to be incorrect, but that it is his duty to point out wherein he deems the same to be incorrect, and to note his corrections thereon, and to sign the same as correct.
. . . .
If he deemed incorrect the bill of exceptions presented to him, he was under an implied duty to point out wherein he deemed the same incorrect so that the aggrieved parties might have an opportunity to amend the same, and then to sign the same as corrected.
Reed v. Adams ,
236 Miss. 333, 340-41, 111 So.2d 222, 224-25 (1959). In this case, the board president did sign the original bill of exceptions, under the statement "Acknowledged by (without agreeing to the facts herein stated)." However, rather than following the procedure for submitting a corrected bill of exceptions, the Board filed a response to the bill of exceptions, and to the amended bill of exceptions, in the form of an answer to a complaint, admitting or denying the allegations therein. Moreover, following the circuit court's remand of the matter back to the Board for further consideration, no amended bill of exceptions was filed whatsoever to take the appeal back to the circuit court for final determination.
If the bill of exceptions is not complete and is fatally defective in that pertinent and important facts and documents are omitted therefrom, then the court does not have a record upon which it can intelligently act. This Court has held that a proper bill of exceptions on appeal is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court.
Stewart v. City of Pascagoula ,
206 So.2d 325, 328 (Miss. 1968). In
Stewart , this Court held that the circuit court correctly dismissed an appeal taken from the decision of a city council, because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter due to a fatally defective bill of exceptions.
Id . In this case, the circuit court should have taken similar action.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15. Because the circuit court acted without proper jurisdiction over the dispute in question due to a fatally defective bill of exceptions, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reverse the circuit court's judgment, and remand this case to the circuit court with instructions to allow the parties to file a proper amended bill of exceptions following the procedure outlined in Reed , supra.
¶ 16. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
PRATHER, C.J., BANKS, P.J., MILLS, WALLER AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR. PITTMAN, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.