DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff commenced this action on December 1, 1998. The second cause of action, sought to enforce a trust on funds received in connection with an improvement to real property pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A. Such a cause of action must be interposed no more than one year after completion of the improvement (see, Lien Law § 77). Here, the improvement was completed more than one year before this action was commenced. Consequently, the second cause of action is time-barred.
Similarly, the plaintiff's fifth cause of action alleging defamation is governed by a one-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 215). Because the alleged defamatory remarks were made more than one year before this action was commenced, the fifth cause of action is also time-barred. There is no merit to the plaintiff's contention that the defendants Robert Corke and Ted D'Amore are equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense.
The Supreme Court properly concluded that both the sixth cause of action, alleging tortious interference with prospective economic relations, and the seventh cause of action, alleging prima facie tort, failed to state a cause of action (see, Hakim v. PaineWebber, 261 A.D.2d 578; M.J. K. Co. v. Matthew Bender Co., 220 A.D.2d 488).