DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
We agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the plaintiff's first through seventh causes of action seek recovery in quantum meruit, not for breach of contract, and therefore must be dismissed because they relate to the employment relationship between the parties, which is governed by an express agreement (see, Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382; Epelbaum v. Nefesh Achath B'Yisrael, 237 A.D.2d 327). Similarly, the eighth cause of action sounding in fraud, and the ninth cause of action alleging unjust enrichment, were properly dismissed (see, Davidson Metals Corp. v. Marlo Dev. Co., 238 A.D.2d 465; Cleffi v. Crescent Beach Club, 2 22 A.D.2d 642). To the extent the plaintiff contends that he pleaded causes of action alleging breach of contract, he has failed to demonstrate any breach of his employment agreement.
Further, the causes of action alleging employment discrimination were properly dismissed, as they were supported only by conclusory statements of no probative value which did not raise material issues of fact (see generally, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792; Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., 118 F.3d 60, 64).
In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to address the plaintiff's contention regarding the inapplicability of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (see, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.).