JEFFREY L. RESNICK, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER came for consideration on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion and Plaintiff filed a reply to such opposition. Plaintiff seeks a protective order with regard to production of documents at scheduled depositions of Plaintiff's expert witnesses, Dr. Copemann and Dr. Pettingil as follows:
1. Notice of Deposition and Subpoena Duces Tecum notice to:
"16. Produce all invoices and requests for payments billed by you to Lee J. Rohn and/or the offices of Lee J. Rohn from the time period beginning January 1, 1999 through and including October 9, 2000.
17. Produce each and every agreement between you and the Law Office of Lee J. Rohn and/or you and Lee J. Rohn."
18. Produce the corporation minute book and stock transfer ledger for the Caribbean Behavioral Institute and for any other corporation in which you have owned stock or served as an officer or director subsequent to Caribbean Behavioral Institute" (#18 is applicable only to Dr. Copemann).
2. That Plaintiff's experts provide "the correspondence, rough drafts of reports and the like" only as provided by Defendants' expert witnesses (presumably referring to Defendants' Notice to Produce numbers 4, 5, 6, and 7).
In their opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to move for a protective order on subpoenas issued to non-party experts and that the documents sought are discoverable as evidence of possible bias of Plaintiff's expert witnesses. Many courts have routinely considered, without discussion of standing, a party's motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum addressed to that party's expert witnesses. (See e.g. Perry v. U.S. 1997 WL 53136 (N.D.Tex. 1997); Ambrose v. Southworth Products Corp., 1997 WL 470359 *1 (W.D.Va.); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pure Air on the Lake Limited Partnership, 154 F.R.D. 202, 204 (N.D.Ind. 1993); Marsh v. Jackson 141 F.R.D. 431 (W.D.Va. 1991); Quaile v. Carol Cable Co., Inc. 1992 WL 277981 (E.D.Pa.); First State Bank of Junction City Kansas v. Deere Co. et al., 1991 WL 456375 (D. Kan).
Other courts have allowed such challenges based on the party's claim to "some personal right or privilege in respect to the subject matter of a subpoena duces tecum directed to a non-party." Davis v. General Accident Insurance Company of America, 1999 WL 228944 (E.D. Pa); New Park Entertainment L.L.C. v. Electric Factory Concerts, Inc. 2000 WL 62315 *4 (E.D.Pa.) (The party also urged standing to seek a protective order if it believes that its interest are "jeopardized by discovery sought from a third person)", citing Wright, Miller Marcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 2035; Norris Mfg. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co. 29 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Md. 1961).
In Alper v. United States, 190 F.R.D. 281, 283 (D. Mass. 2000) the court noted that, "given the facts that Dr. Becker is defendant's expert, the documents which plaintiff seeks from him may be considered within defendant's control."
That case has been otherwise examined by the Court and noted to be far afield. Order dated 7/3/00.
Given the extended history of other expert discovery rulings in this case and because internal consistency is required and further because Defendants' subpoena seeks information which may impact personal rights or privilege of Plaintiff's attorney, the Court will allow Plaintiff standing to assert this motion. The courts have held that the amount of income derived from services related to testifying as an expert witness is relevant to show bias or financial interest. Butler v. Rigsby et al. 1998 WL 164857 *4 (E.D.La.). See also: State of Missouri v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55, 64 (Miss. Ct. Appeals 1992); Hawkins v. South Plains International Trucks, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 679, 681 (D.Col. 1991); Bockweg v. Anderson, 177 F.R.D. 563, 565-66 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Collins v. Wayne Corporation, 621 F.2d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 1980); 63 UMKCLR 133.
It would also be unfair and unwieldy to require the expert witnesses to retain counsel to contest such subpoenas.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Defendants' Notice for Production of the expert witnesses' invoices and requests for payments billed to Plaintiff's attorney for a less than two year period is reasonable and may be relevant to consideration of the witnesses' bias. Because the expert witnesses often testify in cases for Plaintiff's attorney, they must routinely provide a listing of other cases in which they have testified per Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B) and accordingly the marshaling of such billing information should not be unduly onerous. Defendants' other Notices to Produce (#17 and 18) are over broad and will be denied.
Plaintiff's request to limit production of "correspondence, rough drafts of reports, and the like" only as ordered of Defendants' witnesses is unavailing. The parties have an independent duty to comply with Court Orders.
Plaintiff's "concern" that the Notices of Deposition and subpoenas were not signed by local counsel and that all pleadings and documents filed must be signed by local counsel is incorrect. LRCi 83.1.
Accordingly, it is hereby; ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's motion is DENIED with regard to Notice to Produce number 16.
2. Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED with regard to Notice to Produce numbers 17 and 18.
3. Plaintiff's expert witness shall produce the documents requested in Defendants' Notice to produce numbers 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the same manner as ordered of Defendants in the Order dated November 2, 2000.