DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as granted the motion of the defendant Daniel Schwartz for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs
The appeal from so much of the intermediate order as granted the motion of the defendant Daniel Schwartz for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in favor of that defendant in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5501[a][1]).
It is well settled that to maintain an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the existence of a doctor-patient relationship is necessary (see, Heller v. Peekskill Community Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 265; Lee v. City of New York, 162 A.D.2d 34). In the instant action, no such relationship existed between the plaintiff and the respondents. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the causes of action based on medical malpractice (cf., Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86; Heller v. Peekskill Community Hosp., supra; Hickey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 158 A.D.2d 112; Cogswell v. Chapman, 249 A.D.2d 865). Moreover, the respondents Eugene Becker and Daniel Schwartz had no duty to warn the plaintiff of her husband's vicious tendencies. The plaintiff was well aware of those tendencies, because her husband had stabbed her on a previous occasion (see, Adams v. Elgart, 213 A.D.2d 436, 438; Wagshall v. Wagshall, 148 A.D.2d 445). Thus, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claims insofar as asserted against those respondents.