DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
It is well settled that "where a party disobeys a court order, and by his or her conduct frustrates the disclosure scheme provided by the CPLR, dismissal of a pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court" (Castrignano v. Flynn, 255 A.D.2d 352, 353; see, CPLR 3126; Ranfort v. Peak Tours, 250 A.D.2d 747; Frias v. Fortini, 240 A.D.2d 467; Kubacka v. Town of N. Hempstead, 240 A.D.2d 374). The substitution of their counsel provided the defendants third-party plaintiffs with a reasonable excuse for the delays in discovery (cf., Rodriguez v. All Am. Auto Rental, 179 A.D.2d 632). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendants third-party plaintiffs' answer and properly imposed a sanction for their delay (see, Smith v. New York Tel. Co., 235 A.D.2d 529; Athanasiou v. First Nat'l City Bank US Corp., 225 A.D.2d 726).
The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in requiring the plaintiff Nick Parente to submit to a physical examination, where discovery had not been completed (see, Leugemors v. Slawinski, 255 A.D.2d 913; cf., Vitello v. JAM Installers, 264 A.D.2d 774; Gill v. United Parcel Serv., 249 A.D.2d 265).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.