GUADALUPE v. PETERSON

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Docket Number

No. 2D00-511.

Attorney(S)

Mark H. Perenich of Perenich, Carroll, Perenich, Avril Caulfield, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellant. Tony Griffith of Tanney, Eno, Tanney, Griffith Ingram, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellee Peterson. Gregory D. Jones, Carmen Alpizar and Matthew R. Danahy of Rywant, Alvarez, Jones, Russo Guyton, P.A., Tampa, and Richard T. Heiden of Kimpton, Burke, White Heiden, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellees Railey and Eggers and Son Roofing.

Judges

Threadgill, Acting Chief Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Joan Guadalupe, challenged an order denying her motion to set aside a settlement and final judgment entered in a wrongful death action filed by the decedent's wife, as personal representative of the estate of John Guadalupe, deceased. The wrongful death action concerned the death of the appellant's twenty-three-year-old married son. The appellant alleged she was never notified of her right to claim compensation, that the trial court failed to approve the settlement as required by statute, and that the personal representative executed a release of the appellant's claim without proper authority. The trial court denied the motion, concluding the appellant had no claim under the Wrongful Death Act because her son was emancipated and not a minor child under the statute. The appellant did not contest the settlement amount but complained about not receiving any proceeds.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appellant was entitled to relief from the final judgment and settlement under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) based on alleged lack of notice and improper authority of the personal representative.
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the appellant had no claim under the Wrongful Death Act because her son was married and thus not a minor child under the statute.
Whether the trial court was required to approve the settlement under section 768.25, Florida Statutes, and if failure to do so invalidated the settlement.
Whether the personal representative had authority to execute a release on behalf of the appellant and the effect of such execution on the settlement's validity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant argued she was never notified by the personal representative of her right to claim compensation in the wrongful death action.
She contended the trial court failed to approve the settlement as required by section 768.25, Florida Statutes.
She asserted that the personal representative executed a release of her claim without proper authority.
The appellant challenged the distribution of the settlement proceeds, not the amount of the settlement itself.

Appellees' Arguments

The appellees maintained the appellant was not a party to the wrongful death action and thus had no standing to challenge the judgment.
They argued the trial court was not required to approve the settlement because no survivor objected during the pendency of the action.
The appellees contended that persons dealing in good faith with a personal representative for value are protected under Florida law, even if the personal representative lacked authority to execute releases on behalf of others.
They asserted that it would be inequitable to set aside the settlement after distribution of proceeds to the personal representative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Continental Nat'l Bank v. Brill, 636 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)	Personal representative must bring a single wrongful death action for all beneficiaries; obligation to apportion settlement proceeds equitably.	Supported the court's rejection of appellant's standing and explained fiduciary duties of personal representative regarding settlement proceeds.
Benson v. Benson, 533 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)	Decedent's parents lack standing to bring wrongful death action; action must be brought by personal representative.	Reinforced that appellant, as parent, was not a party to the wrongful death action and lacked standing to contest judgment.
Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1989)	When a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, legislative history should be consulted.	Guided the court's interpretation of "minor children" under the Wrongful Death Act in light of legislative amendments.
Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1979)	When legislature omits words in an amendment, courts may presume a change in statutory meaning.	Supported the court's conclusion that the 1981 amendment broadened the definition of "minor children" to include married children under 25.
Hanley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 334 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1976)	Pre-1981 case interpreting "minor children" in wrongful death context.	Distinguished as decided before the 1981 amendment; thus not controlling on the issue of married minors.
Guarniere v. Henderson, 171 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)	Pre-1981 case on wrongful death claims by parents of deceased children.	Distinguished for same reasons as Hanley; not controlling due to legislative changes.
Pearson v. DeLamerens, 656 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)	Personal representative liable for breach of fiduciary duty to interested persons to same extent as trustee of express trust.	Supported the court’s explanation of fiduciary duties and potential remedies available to appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the appellant’s motion to set aside the settlement and final judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), concluding the trial court properly denied the motion. The judgment was not void for lack of notice because the appellant was not a party to the wrongful death action, which must be brought by the decedent’s personal representative under section 768.20, Florida Statutes. The court noted that no survivor objected to the settlement during the case, so no approval was required under section 768.25.

The court further reasoned that even if the personal representative lacked authority to release the appellant’s claim, the defendants who settled in good faith are protected by section 733.611, Florida Statutes. Since the appellant did not challenge the settlement amount but only the distribution, it would be inequitable to set aside the entire settlement.

However, the court found error in the trial court’s conclusion that the appellant had no claim under the Wrongful Death Act. The trial court had relied on section 743.01, which emancipates married minors, to exclude the appellant’s claim. The appellate court examined the statutory definition of "minor children" in section 768.18(2), which includes children under 25 years regardless of marital status. The court consulted legislative history, including the 1981 amendment that removed "dependent unmarried" from the definition and extended the age to 25, indicating legislative intent to include married children under 25 as minors for wrongful death claims.

The court distinguished pre-1981 cases cited by the trial court as no longer controlling due to the amendment. Finally, the court explained that the appellant is not without remedy because the personal representative, as a fiduciary, must reasonably and equitably apportion settlement proceeds among the estate and survivors and may be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty if acting improperly or in bad faith.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the denial of the appellant’s motion to set aside the settlement and final judgment.

The direct effect of this decision is that the settlement and final judgment in the wrongful death action remain valid and enforceable, and the appellant may not disrupt the distribution of proceeds by challenging the settlement post-judgment. However, the court clarified that the appellant does have a potential claim under the Wrongful Death Act as a parent of a child under 25 years old, regardless of marital status, and may seek redress through the fiduciary duties owed by the personal representative. No new precedent was established beyond the interpretation of the statutory definition of "minor children" and the reaffirmation of fiduciary duties in wrongful death settlements.

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JOAN GUADALUPE, Sur

Threadgill, Acting Chief Judge.

The appellant challenges an order denying her motion to set aside a settlement and final judgment entered in an action for the wrongful death of her twenty-three year-old, married son. The action was filed by the decedent's wife, as personal representative. In her motion to set aside, based on Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), the appellant alleged that she was never notified by the personal representative of her right to claim compensation, that the trial court never approved the settlement as required by section 768.25, Florida Statutes (1997), and that the personal representative executed a release of the appellant's claim without proper authority. The trial court held that the appellant did not have a claim because her son was emancipated and, therefore, was not a minor child under the Wrongful Death Act, sections 768.16 through 768.27, Florida Statutes (1997). We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion for relief from judgment, but we do not agree that the appellant had no claim under the Wrongful Death Act.

In this case, the personal representative settled the wrongful death action for the defendants' insurance policy limits, or $1,000,000, plus $10,000 paid directly by the defendants. The appellant does not challenge the amount of the settlement. Instead, she complains that she did not receive any of the proceeds.

The trial court properly denied the motion to set aside the settlement and final judgment. The judgment entered in this case was not void ab initio for lack of notice to a party, as argued by the appellant. The appellant was not a party to the wrongful death action. See § 768.20 (wrongful death action shall be brought by decedent's personal representative); Continental Nat'l Bank v. Brill, 636 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (personal representative must bring single action to recover damages for all beneficiaries); Benson v. Benson, 533 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (decedent's parents without standing to bring wrongful death action as such action must be brought by personal representative).

Further, the trial court was not required to approve the settlement in this case, because no objection was entered by any survivor during the pendency of the action. See § 768.25. And, even if the personal representative was without authority to execute the release on behalf of the appellant, it would be inequitable to set aside the entire settlement and final judgment on that basis. A person who in good faith deals with a personal representative for value is protected as if the personal representative properly exercised her power and is not bound to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or delivered to the personal representative. See § 733.611, Fla. Stat. (1997). Here, the settlement proceeds have already been distributed to the personal representative. It would be unfair to penalize the defendants, who settled in good faith with an authorized party, where the appellant does not challenge the amount of the settlement, but only the distribution of the proceeds.

The trial court's rationale for denying the motion, however, was erroneous. An action for wrongful death is to be brought by a decedent's personal representative, who recovers for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate. See § 768.20. The definition of "survivor" includes a decedent's parents. See § 768.18(1). Section 768.21(4) states that each parent of a deceased minor child may recover for mental pain and suffering from the date of the injury. Section 768.18(2) defines "minor children" as children under 25 years of age, notwithstanding the age of majority. Here, the trial court determined that section 743.01, Florida Statutes (1997), which removes the disability of nonage of a minor who is married, changes the decedent's status from that of a minor to that of an adult for the purpose of section 768.18(2). As a result, the court concluded that the appellant has no claim under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of her son.

Section 768.18(2), however, is susceptible to more than one interpretation: the first being that it includes married children, and the second being that it does not. When a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is helpful to refer to legislative history.See Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1989). The definition of "minor children" in section 768.18(2) was amended in 1981 to delete the terms "dependent unmarried" and to change the age from 21 to 25 years. See Ch. 81-183, § 1, at 554, Laws of Fla. When the legislature amends a statute by omitting words, courts may presume it intends the statute to have a different meaning than that accorded before the amendment. See Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1979). The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Senate Bill 150, which was enacted as chapter 81-183, notes that the changes would "allow parents of a child under 25, regardless of the marital or dependent status of the child, to recover mental pain and suffering damages for the wrongful death of the child." This history makes clear the legislature's intent to include all children under the age of 25 years within the definition of "minor children," regardless of their marital status. The cases relied upon by the trial court in the final judgment, Hanley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 334 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1976), and Guarniere v. Henderson, 171 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), were decided before the 1981 amendment and are, therefore, distinguishable.

The appellant is not without a remedy. A personal representative is a fiduciary who is required to use the authority conferred upon her for the best interests of the interested persons. See § 733.602(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Where the personal representative receives a nonspecific settlement offer in a wrongful death action, she is obligated to apportion the proceeds between the estate and the survivors in a reasonable and equitable manner. See Continental Nat'l Bank, 636 So.2d at 784. If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper or in bad faith, the personal representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a breach of her fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust. See § 733.609, Fla. Stat. (1997); Pearson v. DeLamerens, 656 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to set aside the settlement and final judgment.

Parker and Salcines, JJ., Concur.