EDWARD H. JOHNSTONE, Senior Judge.
Defendant moved to transfer this case to the Middle District of Tennessee, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (dkt. # 3). For the reasons that follow, the motion (dkt. # 3) will be granted.
This is a premises liability case in which Plaintiff alleges injury resulting from his presence on the loading dock of the Wal-Mart Store located at 768 South Jefferson Avenue, Cookeville (Putnam County), Tennessee, 38501, on November 7, 1998. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege any injury in Kentucky or any negligent act by Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in Kentucky. Plaintiff has no idea who manufactured the loading dock equipment that allegedly injured him, who exercised control over the equipment at the time of his alleged injury, or whether these Defendants do business in Kentucky.
Plaintiff received initial medical treatment for his alleged injuries at Cookeville General Hospital. None of the necessary witnesses, other than Plaintiff himself and several medical providers, are present within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The incident site, as well as most of the witnesses in this case, are located in Tennessee.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
This action could have originally been brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee because "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" in that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses," and "in the interest of justice," this action will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
ORDER
Defendant moved to transfer this case to the Middle District of Tennessee, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (dkt. # 3). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum opinion,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Defendant's motion to transfer (dkt. # 3) is granted. This case is transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
(2) This is not a final and appealable order.