DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court correctly determined that the instant action was barred by the releases signed by the plaintiff releasing the defendants from "any and all claims * * * arising from the business relationship" between the parties. The meaning and coverage of a general release necessarily depends upon the controversy being settled and upon the purpose for which the release was given. A release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not intend to cover (see, Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 299; Grab v. Jewish Assn. for Servs. for Aging, 254 A.D.2d 455, 456; Dillon v. Dean, 236 A.D.2d 360; Structural Processing Corp. v. Farboil Co., 234 A.D.2d 284; Lefrak SBN Assocs. v. Kennedy Galleries, 203 A.D.2d 256). Under the circumstances of this case, there was no question that the releases at issue were intended to include the plaintiff's present causes of action (see, K3 Equip. Corp. v. Kintner, 233 A.D.2d 556; Mergler v. Crystal Props. Assocs., 179 A.D.2d 177; Matter of O'Hara, 85 A.D.2d 669; cf., Best v. Yutaka, 90 N.Y.2d 833; Grab v. Jewish Assn. for Servs. for Aging, supra).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.