DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff's prior action, based on the same transaction as that upon which the present action is based, was dismissed on April 9, 1998, under circumstances evincing a neglect to prosecute (see, Keel v. Parke, Davis Co., 72 A.D.2d 546, affd 50 N.Y.2d 833). The Supreme Court therefore properly dismissed the present action, holding that it was not commenced within the applicable prescriptive period (see, CPLR 214-a), and also properly determined that the action could not be deemed timely pursuant to CPLR 205(a).
The plaintiff's reliance on Schuman v. Hertz Corp. ( 17 N.Y.2d 604), is unpersuasive. Contrary to the facts of that case, the record here does not permit, much less compel, the conclusion that dismissal of the prior action was intended to be without prejudice to the commencement of a second action. The affirmation submitted by the plaintiff's substitute counsel, in which she asserts that the Justice who dismissed the prior action told her that the dismissal was "without prejudice", is contradicted by an affirmation of defense counsel, and is not supported by the record.