DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the plaintiffs ' notice of cross appeal from an order entered August 9, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the amended order entered August 24, 1999; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal and the cross appeal from the order entered May 7, 1999, are dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the amended order entered August 24, 1999, made upon reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal from the order entered August 9, 1999, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the amended order entered August 24, 1999; and it is further,
ORDERED that the amended order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal and cross appeal arise from a series of inter-municipal agreements (hereinafter agreements), regarding waste disposal, which were entered into in 1985 between the Town of Hempstead, the Town Board of the Town of Hempstead (hereinafter the Town), and the Incorporated Villages of Atlantic Beach, East Rockaway, Floral Park, Garden City, Lynbrook, and Rockville Centre (hereinafter the Villages).
Contrary to the Villages' contention, the agreements are unambiguous to the extent that they require each Village to pay certain "minimum commitment" tonnage fees, as calculated by the formula set forth in the agreements, regardless of the actual amount of waste tonnage delivered (see, W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162; SSC Corp. v. Town of Brookhaven, 225 A.D.2d 535, 536; see also, Mercury Bay Boating Club v. San Diego Yacht Club, 76 N.Y.2d 256, 269-270). The Villages argue that they were effectively precluded from pursuing their claim for a minimum commitment credit for waste delivered by private carters because the Town's motion for summary judgment effectively prevented further discovery on that issue. This contention is without merit. The Villages do not specify what particular evidence they seek, and it is well settled that the mere hope by the party opposing summary judgment that it will uncover evidence that will prove its case is insufficient under CPLR 3212(f) to postpone a decision on a summary judgment motion (see, Chemical Bank v. PIC Motors Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 1023, 1026; Carrington v. City of New York, 201 A.D.2d 525, 526; American Prescription Plan v. American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO Health Plan, 170 A.D.2d 471).
With respect to the charges to be imposed for the use of the Town's transfer facility, the court correctly concluded that, under the terms of the agreements, the Villages were only obligated to pay a transfer facility fee equal to the amount of waste tonnage they actually delivered to the facility (see generally, Olson Enterprises v. Agway, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 659, 661; Stanita Realty Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 116 A.D.2d 567).
The Town argues that certain extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that the Villages were not entitled to any credit toward their minimum commitment tonnage for yard waste. It is well settled that "[e]vidence outside of the four corners of the document as to what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally inadmissible to add to or vary the writing" (W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, supra; see, SSC Corp. v. Town of Brookhaven, supra, Mercury Bay Boating Club v. San Diego Yacht Club, supra). However, to the extent that the agreements are ambiguous regarding the issue of yard waste, any ambiguities must be construed against the Town, since it drafted the agreements (see, Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454; Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Schaefer, 70 N.Y.2d 888).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.