DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motions are granted, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to the plaintiffs to replead the cause of action alleging wrongful death.
The defendants contend, inter alia, that to the extent that the plaintiffs' complaint seeks to recover damages for the wrongful death of their twins born prematurely, it should be dismissed because it fails to plead the essential elements of such a cause of action. We agree.
Although a cause of action alleging wrongful death may be maintained on behalf of an infant who is born alive but dies shortly after birth (see, Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 486), the elements of a wrongful death claim include the survival of distributees who suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the decedent's death, and the appointment of a personal representative of the decedent (see, Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity, 119 A.D.2d 200; Chong v. New York City Tr. Auth., 83 A.D.2d 546). Since the plaintiffs' complaint does not allege that a personal representative of the decedents has been appointed or that the plaintiffs suffered pecuniary injuries, it does not state a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death (see, Meroni v. Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity, supra; Chong v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra). We note that, contrary to the defendants' contention, there is an issue of fact as to whether the twins were stillborn, as the defendants claim, or born alive as defined by Public Health Law § 4130(1). In view of the fact that the plaintiffs may have a potentially viable cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death, we grant leave to replead (see, Chong v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra).
We also conclude that the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the defendants' motions which were to dismiss the plaintiff mother's medical malpractice cause of action seeking damages for the psychic and emotional harm she suffered as a result, inter alia, of the premature birth of her infants. In the absence of an allegation that the plaintiff mother suffered any physical injury separate and apart from that which occurs in any normal childbirth, she may not recover such damages (see, Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931; Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809; Scott v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, 191 A.D.2d 772; Burgess v. Miller, 124 A.D.2d 692). The plaintiff father's derivative claim for loss of consortium, which is predicated upon the emotional injury to the mother, must also be dismissed.