This Court has expressly held in Matter of Muller v. New York State Div. of Hous. and Community Renewal ( 263 A.D.2d 296) that the RRRA's four-year limitation period governs FMRAs. Accordingly, since petitioners commenced their DHCR proceeding more than four years after the rent registration they sought to challenge in the context of an FMRA, their FMRA challenge was properly deemed time-barred by DHCR when it ruled upon the matter in 1998 (id.; RRRA of 1997, L. 1997, Ch. 116, see also, Matter of Sol Goldman v. New York State Div. of Hous. and Community Renewal, 270 A.D.2d 169).
Contrary to petitioners' contention, DHCR was not precluded by its delay from considering this FMRA under the time limitation established by the RRRA. Administrative delay does not warrant limitation of DHCR review, absent a showing that the delay was wilful or a result of negligence (id.), and petitioners make no such showing. Moreover, the complained of delay was attributable, in part, to adjournments requested by petitioners. Accordingly, we perceive no ground to exempt petitioners from the RRRA which, by its express terms, was applicable to all pending proceedings, of which petitioners' was one.
Finally, since rent regulation does not confer vested rights (see,I.L.F.Y. Co. v. City Rent Rehabilitation Admin., 11 N.Y.2d 480), petitioners' argument that the application of the RRRA's limitation period to pending cases violates due process by depriving them of the benefit of pre-RRRA rent regulation provisions law more favorable to their claims is without merit.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.