1. Defendant, at the time he made the conveyance of his homestead to his daughter for a nominal consideration, was not insolvent, did not act with intent to defraud his creditors and did not, by his act, divest himself of all his apparent assets. In fact, at the time he executed the conveyance which complainant seeks to have set aside, he was worth $87,000 above his indebtedness. Held, the conveyance will not be set aside as made to hinder and delay creditors.
2. The fact that defendant was subsequently unable to pay his debts should not, under the facts of this case, justify the drawing of the unfavorable inference that defendant intended to hinder and delay his creditors by making the conveyance in question.
3. To draw an inference of fraud when the opposite inference may be drawn, and fairly so, is not the province of a court of equity.
4. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance act changed the former rule that there is an irrebuttable presumption of fraud as to a voluntary conveyance made by one indebted. Under the act, in the absence of proved fraud, that is, actual intent instead of intent presumed in law — a solvent debtor is permitted to make a gift of a portion of his estate without subjecting the property so disposed of to successful attack.
PER CURIAM.
The decree appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons stated by Vice-Chancellor Sooy in the court of chancery.
For affirmance — THE CHIEF-JUSTICE, LLOYD, CASE, BODINE, DONGES, HEHER, PERSKIE, HETFIELD, DEAR, WELLS, WOLFSKEIL, RAFFERTY, JJ. 12.
For reversal — None.