Plaintiff alleged he was assaulted while at the Church by co-defendant Clarke, that Clarke was a Church employee and that the Church was liable based upon negligent hiring and supervision of Clarke since it was aware of his vicious propensities and involvement in a prior altercation. The IAS court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that the "essence" of plaintiff's complaint was based on Clarke's assault, that more than one year elapsed between the assault and the commencement of this action and that the one-year Statute of Limitation for an intentional tort barred this action. While plaintiff's damages may have been immediately caused by Clarke's assault, liability against the Church is not based upon allegations that it intentionally harmed plaintiff but that it negligently hired and supervised Clarke. The relevant Statute of Limitation is, accordingly, three years (Jarvis v. Nation of Islam, 251 A.D.2d 116; Siagha v. Salant-Jerome, Inc., 249 A.D.2d 11 appeal dismissed 92 N.Y.2d 946). The intentional nature of the employee's wrongful conduct does not thereby transform negligence of the employer into intentional conduct. "`A single act or default causing a single injury may constitute a breach of different duties and may give rise to causes of action based upon different grounds of liability and subject to different statutory periods of limitations [citations omitted]'" (Wimmer v. Pratt Institute, 63 A.D.2d 885 quoting King v. King, 13 A.D.2d 437, 440). The IAS court relied upon inapposite decisional authority which involved an insurance contract with a specific contract clause excluding liability for any claim based on assault (U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Val-Blue Corp., 85 N.Y.2d 821). This case involves a separate party alleged to have breached distinct duties owed to plaintiff.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.