Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and statements was properly denied. Since the police did not enter defendant's apartment until after he threw a lit flare at an officer and set his apartment on fire, a point at which police and fire personnel were obviously duty-bound to enter, there is no basis for suppression of any of the fruits of the entry. The record fails to support defendant's argument that his incendiary conduct was "provoked" by allegedly unlawful prior police intrusions (see, People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97). In any event, the police preparations for making an emergency entry, which included removing the peephole from defendant's door and breaking and opening windows, were independently justified, under the emergency doctrine, by the totality of the information available to the police at the time (People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, cert denied_ 426 U.S. 953; Matter of Pablo C., 220 A.D.2d 235; People v. Scala, 159 A.D.2d 259, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 742;see also, Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102). A psychiatrist informed the police that he had learned from defendant's mother that her son intended to kill himself and had four bottles of gasoline in his apartment. The psychiatrist showed the police his credentials and accompanied them to defendant's apartment, where the police smelled gasoline and observed that defendant had barricaded himself inside and was making bizarre statements.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The jury properly concluded that defendant's conduct constituted reckless endangerment in the first degree (see, Penal Law § 120.25; People v. Narimanbekov, 258 A.D.2d 417).
We perceive no basis for reduction of sentence.