We reject defendant Altman's argument that an extension of the CPLR 306-b 120-day period to make service of the summons and complaint may be granted only if no service, as opposed to improper service, is made within the 120-day period (see, Gurevitch v. Goodman, 269 A.D.2d 355; cf., Salamon v. Charney, 269 A.D.2d 256). Such "extensions should be liberally granted whenever plaintiffs have been reasonably diligent in attempting service" (Memorandum of the Office of Court Administration #97-67R, 1997 New York State Legislative Annual, at 319), regardless of the expiration of the Statute of Limitations after filing and before service (see, Griffin v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Center, 276 A.D.2d 391, 715 N.Y.S.2d 633). Clearly, plaintiff's efforts to serve defendant Altman were reasonably diligent. The second action, which plaintiff commenced before the order of September 22, 1999 apparently reinstated his first action, was timely commenced within six months after the first action was dismissed for what were characterized by the motion court as "law office failings" (CPLR 205[a];see, Tellez v. Saranda Realty, 197 A.D.2d 439).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.