AMALFITANO v. U.S

WOOD, U.S.D.J.:

Michael Amalfitano ("plaintiff") has brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act. The United States, the Federal Elections Commission, and Janet Reno ("defendants") have moved the Court to dismiss the action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Background

In 1993, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq., "to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)(1). The NVRA imposes requirements on states such as that states enable motor vehicle registration forms to serve as voter registration forms, state public assistance offices serve as agencies for federal voter registration, and states create a mail-in voter registration form that does not require notarization. In 1994, the State of New York enacted state law to comply with the federal requirements. 1994 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 659.

Plaintiff alleges that the NVRA prevents him from being able to petition and communicate with the New York State legislature. Specifically, plaintiff states that:

[He] is a citizen of New York who wished to petition, and communicate with, the New York legislature in the hope that the legislature would repeal that legislation which had been enacted in the State's efforts to comply with the [NVRA] . . .; however, Plaintiff did not engage in such actions solely because his ability to petition, and communicate with, the New York legislature in a meaningful manner with respect to these issues has been rendered futile by the Act.

Complaint at ¶ 5.

II. Discussion

To have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must determine that plaintiff has standing to bring suit. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989). To establish standing, plaintiff must plead: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff fails to satisfy the first prong of the standing test. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, dated July 3, 2000, at p. 4. The first prong requires that plaintiff prove that he has an injury in fact that is "both concrete in nature and particularized to [him]." In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1023-24. Plaintiff must plead that he has been "directly affected by the . . . practices against which [his] complaint [is] directed." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 n. 22 (1982).

Plaintiff claims that he has suffered an injury due to the fact that "under the [NVRA], the New York State legislature is prohibited from acting upon the requests which Plaintiff wished to make to it." Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ["Pl.'s Mem. of Law"], dated July 28, 2000, at p. 5. He argues that he has been deprived of "the relationship which normally exists between a citizen of a State and his legislature, in which such a citizen can request his legislature to make changes in state law and state policy, and the legislature can grant such requests." Id. at p. 2.

Plaintiff states that he does not allege a violation of his First Amendment right to petition the state government. In fact, plaintiff concedes that defendants are "of course, correct in stating that the [NVRA] does not explicitly prohibit Plaintiff from petitioning, or communicating with, his State legislature with respect to his wishes. See Pl.'s Mem. of Law at p. 4.

The Court finds that plaintiff lacks standing for at least two reasons. First, plaintiff has not proven that he has suffered a concrete harm. As explained by defendants, the state is not bound by the federal statute. To the contrary, the state could, if it chose, follow the lead of other states and either repeal the state statute or bring suit against the federal government to challenge the validity of the federal statute. See ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997); ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995); Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (case in which New York state challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute). Second, the injury is not particularized. Plaintiff does not establish that he personally has suffered the alleged injury. The Supreme Court has clearly held that generalized and abstract grievances that affect large numbers of Americans alike are best addressed in the political process, not the judicial system. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (citing, inter alia, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974)).

III. Conclusion

Because plaintiff fails to set forth a judicially cognizable injury in fact, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. All pending motions are moot.

SO ORDERED