Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed in accordance with the following
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of three counts of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35, [3]) and one count of rape in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.30). The testimony of the victim was not improperly bolstered; rather, the People adduced admissible evidence of her prompt complaints ( see, People v McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 16-17; People v. Kornowski, 178 A.D.2d 984, 985, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1096; see also, People v. Kirkey, 248 A.D.2d 979, 980, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 900), which did not contain unnecessary or impermissible details ( see, People v Aybinder, 215 A.D.2d 181, 181-182, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 840; cf., People v. Rice, 75 N.Y.2d 929, 931-932). Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that each complaint was made at "`the first suitable opportunity'" ( People v. McDaniel, supra, at 17; see, People v. Kornowski, supra, at 984-985).
The People concede that the sentence is illegal insofar as it imposes a term of incarceration of 3½ to 7 years for rape in the second degree ( see, Penal Law § 70.00 [b]; [4]). We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the sentence imposed on the count of rape in the second degree to a term of incarceration of 2 to 7 years ( see, e.g., People v. Wingate, 225 A.D.2d 1085, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 970; People v. Lozado, 180 A.D.2d 410, 411).
We have considered the contentions raised in defendant's pro se supplemental brief and conclude that they are without merit.