DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
At her deposition, the plaintiff testified that the accident occurred as she was walking down the street after she had left a T.J. Maxx store in Staten Island. She testified that she stopped walking immediately after she felt a particle or particles of styrofoam enter her eye. She testified that she did not take another step before she tripped. When asked to identify the obstruction on which she tripped, she replied, "Nothing. I just fell".
In the absence of any proof of a dangerous condition that might have caused the plaintiff to trip and fall, the plaintiff argues that there is an issue of fact as to whether she was caused to fall by the particle or particles of styrofoam dust which entered her eye. To accept this hypothesis, a jury would have to "discard common sense and common knowledge" and give credit to testimony "which is incredible and unbelievable, that is * * * contrary to experience" (Loughlin v. City of New York, 186 A.D.2d 176, 177; People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). No rational jury could accept the plaintiff's argument that she was caused to fall to the ground by a particle or particles of styrofoam dust. Under these circumstances, there is no material issue of fact requiring a trial, and the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the respondents.