EDWARD H. JOHNSTONE, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, filed this action against Defendant, David L. Outland, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., to recover triple damages, civil penalties, and costs. The case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 7). Because Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, this Court entered an order to show cause why the motion should not be granted (dkt. # 8). Defendant responded by filing a hand-written letter (dkt. # 9), which the Court construed as a response to the show cause order. The response, however, did not address the merits of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court has considered the merits of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without the benefit of a response from Defendant. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 7) is granted.
BACKGROUND
On August 17, 1994, Defendant submitted a Railroad Retirement Board Form UI-1, Application for Unemployment Benefits and Employment Service to the Railroad Retirement Board in Louisville, Kentucky, as a condition of receiving unemployment insurance benefits. See ex. 1 to dkt. # 7. The form requires a signature, certifying that the applicant has read and understands the Railroad Retirement Board UB-10 Booklet, which describes the rules and reporting requirements, and certifying that the information on the form is true, correct, and complete. Id.; see also dkt. # 5, p. 2.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed upon information and belief, alleged that Defendant was incarcerated for an extended period of time beginning February 3, 1995. Following conversations with Defendant and after receiving Defendant's answer, Plaintiff obtained records from the Office of Pretrial Services, Graves County Circuit Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky, reflecting that Defendant did not begin his incarceration until March 2, 1995. See ex. 2 to dkt. # 7.
Computer records maintained by the Railroad Retirement Board reflect that Defendant filed bi-weekly applications for unemployment benefits while incarcerated on the following dates: March 7, 1995; March 20, 1995, April 4, 1995; April 17, 1995; May 7, 1995; and May 15, 1995. See ex. 3a-3f and ex. 4 to dkt. # 7. Defendant received $36.00 per day in unemployment benefits. Defendant improperly received benefits for the period beginning March 2, 1995, and ending May 15, 1995, for a total of 48 days. At $36.00 per day for 48 days, Defendant received a total of $1,728.00 to which he was not entitled.
In his answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant wrote: "I called the Railroad after I got out of jail and I was told that the rest of my employment benefits were used as penalty under the triple damages act." See dkt. 5, p. 5. In response and in support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed an affidavit, which provided in part:
I, Lee Richard Easterday, am the Assistant Chief of the Sickness and Unemployment Benefits Section at the United States Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). I am responsible for the administration of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) and benefits payable under that Act. I have access to computer records that provide information pertaining to all individuals with creditable railroad service. This information includes service and compensation records, benefits applied for and paid, benefits determined to be recoverable and any re-payments or offsets of benefits made. Mr. David L. Outland last claimed unemployment benefits in May 1995. He has not applied for or received any sickness or unemployment benefits under the RUIA since May of 1995 nor has [sic] any payments or offsets been applied to his debt with the RRB.
See ex. 4 to dkt. # 7. Defendant has not filed an affidavit or any other evidence to refute Easterday's affidavit or any of the other evidence filed by Plaintiff.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment is only granted when ". . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact is on the moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The court construes the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n., Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990). However, when defending against summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). It is not enough that the nonmoving party simply set forth "conclusory allegations." See Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 1994). When reviewing the motion for summary judgment, the court "determine[s] whether `the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
False Claims Act
The False Claims Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Liability for certain acts. Any person who —
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
. . .
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person . . .
. . .
. . . A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
. . .
(c) Claim defined. For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any request or demand . . . for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.
31 U.S.C. § 3729.
Here, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. While incarcerated, Defendant made separate claims for unemployment benefits on March 7, 1995; March 20, 1995, April 4, 1995; April 17, 1995; May 7, 1995; and May 15, 1995. Under the False Claims Act, for each one of the six claims, Plaintiff is entitled to a civil penalty of at least $5,000.00, or a sum of at least $30,000.00. In addition, for the damages of $1,728.00, Plaintiff is entitled to triple damages, or a sum of $5,184.00. Plaintiff is also entitled to the costs of this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant in the amount of $35,184.00 plus costs.
An appropriate Summary Judgment accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 7). For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS ORDERED:
1). Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 7) is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $35,184.00 plus costs.
2). This is a final and appealable order. There is no just cause for delay.