JULIAN T. HOUSTON, JUSTICE.
In this matter, the plaintiff, Dana Rowe Jr. ("Rowe"), moves pursuant to Superior Court Rule 9D for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum and Order on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the previous order, this Court denied the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Rowe qualifies as a handicapped person as defined under G.L. c. 151B, § 117. In its Memorandum of Decision, this Court stated:
Rowe contends that his impairment is the result of a work-related injury and that under G.L. c. 152, § 75B(1), he automatically qualifies as a handicapped person for purposes of his c. 151B claim. Rowe's contention, however, is incorrect. General Laws c. 152, § 75B(1) is limited to the context of workers' compensation claims. This is not the case here. [internal citations omitted]
Rowe argues that the Court's ruling was an error of law that should now be corrected. See Everett Indust. Inc. v. MCAD, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 1116, 1120 n. 13 (2000); Piderit v. Siegal Sons Investment, LTD., 1998 WL 1181187, *2-4 (Mass.Super. 1998); Belonni v. Reservoir Nursing Center, 1994 WL 879457, * 4 n. 5 (Mass.Super. 1994). The defendant, the Town of North Reading, opposes the motion.
Upon closer review of the statutes, this Court rules that as a matter of law, Rowe is not precluded in anyway from pursuing his c. 151B claim under the definition of handicapped contained in G.L. c. 152, § 75B. Rowe's motion for reconsideration is, therefore, ALLOWED . It is further ORDERED that the Court's previous Memorandum and Order on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be modified in accordance with this decision.