While Miller Freeman's failings in securing plaintiffs' valuables at the trade show may be indicative of negligence, they do not evince the recklessness necessary to abrogate the exculpatory clause in the parties' agreement (see Colnaghi v. Jewelers Protection Servs., Ltd., 81 N.Y.2d 821, 823-824; David Gutter Furs v. Jewelers Protection Servs., 79 N.Y.2d 1027;Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Protection Group, 250 A.D.2d 526, 528). Nor have plaintiffs raised any triable issue as to whether they were defrauded by Miller Freeman. No evidence has been presented that Miller Freeman intended to defraud plaintiffs and plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied upon Miller Freeman's purported misrepresentation respecting overnight security, namely, its posting of a security guard to receive items to be held at the overnight storage facility. Given the value of the items stored, which had been delivered to the trade show under armed guard, ordinary prudence should have prompted plaintiffs to inquire specifically as to the measures taken to secure the overnight storage room (see, Stuart Silver Assocs. v. Baco Dev. Corp., 245 A.D.2d 96).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.