Lahtinen, J.
Plaintiff Anthony Roberts was injured while employed as an asbestos handler by third-party defendant, UEC Catalytic, a division of Raytheon Constructors Inc. (hereinafter Raytheon). Raytheon had contracted with defendant General Electric Company (hereinafter GE) to remove asbestos insulation from several chemical tanks at a GE facility in the Town of Waterford, Saratoga County. GE had also employed defendant Failsafe Inc. to act as an independent project administrator and air quality monitor.
The cylindrical chemical tanks involved were 8 to 10 feet in diameter and approximately 18 to 20-feet long. The tanks were mounted horizontally on concrete stands approximately four feet off the floor. The asbestos removal process involved workers positioned on top of the tanks cutting stainless steel support bands to allow pieces of asbestos insulation to fall 12 to 14 feet to the floor where other workers would retrieve, bag and remove them. Roberts was injured when a falling piece of asbestos struck him on the shoulder.
Roberts and his wife, derivatively, commenced this action against GE alleging negligence and liability under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6). GE commenced a third-party action against Raytheon and Failsafe seeking indemnification, and Raytheon and Failsafe interposed cross claims against one another. Thereafter, plaintiffs apparently amended the complaint to include Failsafe as a direct defendant.
Upon various motions by the parties, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against GE, granted summary judgment to GE dismissing the first (negligence /Labor Law § 200) and third (Labor Law § 241) causes of action and established that Raytheon owed GE common-law and contractual indemnification. Raytheon and GE now appeal — by joint brief — challenging that portion of Supreme Court's order granting plaintiffs summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and denying their motions seeking dismissal of that cause of action. Plaintiffs cross appeal only from that part of the order that granted GE's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) causes of action.
Plaintiffs have abandoned their appeal with respect to the Labor to visit her sister, a tenant at the premises. At trial, plaintiff testified that the wooden stairway was wet due to rain and, although there was a handrail along the right side of the stairway, she did not recall utilizing it as she ascended the stairway. She indicated that she proceeded up the stairway somewhere between the middle and right side thereof and, as she climbed from the second to the third step, she either caught her foot underneath the third step or at its tip, causing her to lose her balance. She fell off the left side of the stairway, which did not have a railing.º Law § 200 cause of action and, accordingly, that issue will not bee abandoned their appeal with respect to the Labor to visit her sister, a tenant at the premises. At trial, plaintiff testified that the wooden stairway was wet due to rain and, although there was a handrail along the right side of the stairway, she did not recall utilizing it as she ascended the stairway. She indicated that she proceeded up the stairway somewhere between the middle and right side thereof and, as she climbed from the second to the third step, she either caught her foot underneath the third step or at its tip, causing her to lose her balance. She fell off the left side of the stairway, which did not have a railing.º addressed.
Turning first to plaintiffs' Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, it is settled that this absolute liability statute is to be construed as liberally as it needs to be in order to accomplish its intended purpose of protecting workers from elevation-related risks at work sites (see,Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 520-521; Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 319; Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68; see also, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 500). However, recognizing the statute does not encompass "any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity" (Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra, at 501), we must determine whether Labor Law § 240 (1) was designed to prevent the type of accident which caused Roberts' injury (see, id., at 501).
Initially, we note that Roberts was engaged in "cleaning" a "structure", an activity contemplated by Labor Law § 240 (1). We next consider whether the circumstances surrounding Roberts' work subjected him to the sort of risks which Labor Law § 240 (1) was intended to obviate, which have been identified by the Court of Appeals as those risks "limited to such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted or inadequately secured" (Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra, at 501; see, Melo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 92 N.Y.2d 909, 911-912;Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 487, 491; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514). In our view, the facts of this case support the conclusion that the falling asbestos that struck Roberts was inadequately secured, thus creating a risk covered by Labor Law § 240 (1). We further conclude that any number of the safety devices enumerated in the statute, had they been furnished, would have prevented the dangerous free fall of the asbestos without unduly impeding the progress of the work that Roberts and his co-workers were engaged in at the time of the accident. Consequently, the failure to provide any safety device was a proximate cause of the accident (see, Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, supra, at 521), convincing us to agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as against GE on this cause of action.
Our recent decision in Corey v. Gorick Constr. Co. ( 271 A.D.2d 911) does not require a different holding as it involved a safety device (a backhoe) which functioned as intended. Moreover, when the facts here are examined, as they must be, from the viewpoint of protecting workers, it is simply irrelevant whether the falling asbestos was intentionally or negligently released where the facts otherwise support the application of the provisions of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Campanella v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp., 247 A.D.2d 294, 295; Brust v. Estee Lauder, 184 A.D.2d 474).
We further agree that Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action. To establish a cause of action under that statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has violated a specific safety rule established by the Commissioner of Labor (see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 503-505, supra). Here, plaintiffs rely on an alleged violation of the following regulation:
Every place where persons are required to work or pass that is normally exposed to falling material or objects shall be provided with suitable overhead protection. Such overhead protection shall consist of tightly laid sound planks at least two inches thick full size, tightly laid three-quarter inch exterior grade plywood or other material of equivalent strength * * * ( 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 [a] [1]).
As Supreme Court noted, the purpose of this regulation is apparent, i.e., to protect workers who might be present in a work area subject to the general and unintended risk of falling objects, and has nothing to do with the work procedures employed here.