BATAILLON, United States District Judge.
This matter is before the court on defendants' joint motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (Filing No. 10). I have carefully reviewed the applicable law, the record, the motion to dismiss and the supporting brief as well as the brief in opposition. I find that the motion to dismiss should be overruled at this time.
Facts
Plaintiff Kraftware is in the business of placing computer programmers with clients who have programming projects. Defendant Kuthuru, who was previously employed by Kraftware, was responsible for seeking employees for Kraftware for these projects. The complaint (Filing No. 1) alleges that Kuthuru:
engaged in a pattern of activity, which was both illegal and in breach of his employment contract, by which he diverted funds and confidential and proprietary information of Kraftware to Mandadi and InfoBuilders as more specifically set out below. Mandadi and InfoBuilders were aware of Kuthuru's activity, and participated in this activity, and used Kuthuru as the agent of Mandadi and Infobuilders in committing this activity. . . .
(Filing No. 1, ¶ 2). Kraftware contends that Kuthuru stole confidential and proprietary information and along with Mandadi improperly and fraudulently diverted the business from Kraftware to InfoBuilders. Kraftware has alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and violations of Nebraska state law claims for intentional interference with a business relationship, breach of contract, slander, and fraud.
Legal Standard
"To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating, by a prima facie showing, that personal jurisdiction exists." Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 1998). If the court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction but instead relies upon the pleadings and affidavits, it views the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Boley v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 1996 WL 118280, *4 (E.D.Mo. 1996) (citations omitted); Aaron Ferer Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1977). A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant's activity falls within the scope of the state long-arm statute and if the exercise of jurisdiction under the state statute does not violate federal due process standards of fair play and substantial justice. Id. The Nebraska long-arm statute provides as follows:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person:
(1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to the cause of action arising from the person;
(a) Transacting business in this state;
(b) Contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(c) Causing tortuous injury by an act or omission in this state;
(d) Causing tortuous injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;
(e) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real estate in this state;
(f) Contracting to ensure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or
(2) Who has any other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-536 (Michie 1995). In this case Kraftware has also alleged a RICO violation and asserts jurisdiction under federal law as well.
Discussion
Defendants contend that they had insufficient contacts with the forum to permit jurisdiction over their property. They argue that Kuthuru and Infobuilders are both residents of Texas. Kuthuru's sister, defendant Manadi, is also a resident of Texas. The defendants argue that none of them reside in have an agent in, or transact their affairs in Nebraska. Consequently, they believe there is no personal jurisdiction under the RICO statute or under Nebraska state law. Further, they argue that there are no minimum contact under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316(1945), and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92(1980).
The plaintiff Kraftware contends that this scheme was perpetrated by all the defendants, and that they targeted the plaintiff in Nebraska. Further, defendant Kuthuru lived in Nebraska during the time of the alleged wrongful acts. The harm sustained occurred to a Nebraska corporation, which the Eighth Circuit has held to be sufficient to allow for personal jurisdiction. Oriental Trading Co. Inc. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001). Kraftware argues that Exhibits 2, 4, 6 and 7 (Filing No. 11) show that Kuthuru was inappropriately communicating with Infobuilders and Mandadi, and Exhibits 3 and 5 (Filing No. 11) show that Kuthuru was conducting business in Nebraska. Kraftware contends that InfoBuilders and Mandadi either acted in concert with Kuthuru or allowed Kuthuru to act as an agent on their behalf. In any event, Kraftware argues that it is foreseeable that the resulting activity would harm a Nebraska corporation.
A nonresident's contacts with Nebraska are sufficient to impose jurisdiction under the due process clause "if the defendant has `purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from the alleged injuries `that arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472(1985) (citations omitted). The defendant's "purposeful" contacts with the forum state must be such that "the defendant should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there." World-Wide Vokswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 44 U.S. at 297. The contacts must demonstrate that the defendants were taking advantage of "the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253(1958). The court must consider the defendants' contacts with the forum state in the aggregate, looking at the totality of the circumstances. Northrup King v. Compania Productora Semillas Algodoneras Selectas, 51 F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995).
After thoroughly reviewing the record and briefs, I conclude that the defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied at this time. In considering the totality of the circumstances, I find that the plaintiff has succeeded in making a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over the defendants is appropriate. The exhibits set forth in Filing No. 11 do show correspondence that involves all three defendants. The alleged harm clearly occurred in Nebraska, and it would be foreseeable that such harm would occur in Nebraska. Sufficient minimum contacts exist between Nebraska and the defendants so that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' joint motion to dismiss (Filing No. 10) should be and hereby is denied.