DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to Town Law § 267-c(1), the petitioners had 30 days after the filing of the respondents' determination denying their application for a use variance to commence a proceeding to review that determination. The filing in the office of the Town Clerk occurred on September 8, 1999; however, it is undisputed that the petitioners did not commence this proceeding until November 5, 1999. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion to dismiss the proceeding as time-barred (see, Matter of Kennedy v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Vil. of Croton-on-Hudson, 78 N.Y.2d 1083; Casoloro v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Elmsford, 200 A.D.2d 742; Matter of Pickett v. Town of Tusten Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 169 A.D.2d 906).
The petitioners' contention that the respondents should be estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense is unavailing. It is well settled that estoppel is generally unavailable against a municipality or governmental entity (see, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274). In any event, the petitioners did not demonstrate that the respondents engaged in any fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other improper conduct that would warrant the application of the principles of estoppel (see, Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442; Kroin v. City of New York, 210 A.D.2d 95).
The petitioners' remaining contentions are without merit.