Mindful that the trial court was uniquely well-situated to assess whether there was a need for a new trial (see, Cam v. Mainor, 276 A.D.2d 416), we find that it properly exercised its discretion in denying appellants that relief. We are not "able to conclude that the jury could not have reached its verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence" (see, Ohdan v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d 86, 88, appeal dismissed 95 N.Y.2d 885, lv denied, 95 N.Y.2d 885, 2000 N.Y. LEXIS 3843). More specifically, the verdict that the third-party defendants had supervisory control over the work in which plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury is supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see, Gruter v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 272 A.D.2d 229). Plaintiff proved that his pain and suffering was caused by reason of the injuries sustained in the accident sued upon (see, Beckwith v. Rute, 235 A.D.2d 892, 893-894), and none of the jury's awards deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation under the circumstances. Appellants' complaints about the verdict sheet are not properly preserved, and are in any event without merit.
We have considered appellants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.