The causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel were properly dismissed for lack of specificity and definition (see,Cobble Hill Nursing Home v. Henry Warren Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 475, 482,cert denied 498 U.S. 816; Sanyo Elec. v. Pinros Gar Corp., 174 A.D.2d 452), and the cause of action for conversion does not indicate how or when defendants purportedly exercised a right of ownership over goods belonging to plaintiffs, to the exclusion of plaintiffs' rights (see, Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth., 87 N.Y.2d 36, 44).
Defendants had no special or fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs which would create a duty to disclose that the main investor was a prospective brother-in-law of the person charged with raising capital (see, Auchincloss v. Allen, 211 A.D.2d 417). This, in any event, was not a material fact the concealment of which would give rise to a fraud claim.
The cause of action for tortious interference with prospective business opportunities was also properly dismissed, since plaintiffs failed to allege any specific business relationship they were prevented from entering into by reason of the purported tortious interference (see, Korn v. Princz, 226 A.D.2d 278), or that defendants' acted with the sole purpose of harming plaintiffs or that defendants employed "wrongful means" (see, Snyder v. Sony Music Entertainment, 252 A.D.2d 294, 299-300). Plaintiffs also failed to plead "disinterested malevolence" and special damages, necessary elements of a cause of action for prima facie tort (see, Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 117).
In light of the fact that plaintiffs did not advance any basis to conclude that they had a valid cause of action, the motion court properly exercised its discretion in denying the request to replead (see, CPLR 3211[e]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.