DAVID F. HAMILTON, United States District Judge.
Several motions are pending in this matter, including several arising from the fact that plaintiff has now submitted five versions of a complaint in this action, as well as a motion for preliminary injunction.
I Motions Addressing
The Pleadings Plaintiff Carolyn H. Srivastava filed her original complaint in this action on December 27, 2000, naming Gerald Bepko, Chancellor of Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), in his individual capacity as the only defendant. Before any response was filed, plaintiff exercised her automatic right to amend and filed an amended complaint on January 10, 2001, which added several individual defendants, including Indiana University President Myles Brand. On January 18, 2001, plaintiff then moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, which was granted on January 24, 2001.
In the second amended complaint, plaintiff named the Trustees of Indiana University in their official capacities as defendants and dropped individual capacity claims against individual defendants. The court's order of January 24, 2001, dismissed all claims against individual defendants. Then, on February 9, 2001, plaintiff moved for leave to file a third amended complaint that seeks to restore a claim against Brand in his individual capacity. When defendants opposed that motion, plaintiff attached to her reply brief filed February 23, 2001, her revised "Third Amended Civil Rights Complaint and Jury Demand," which is actually the fifth version of her complaint.
To call plaintiff's filings erratic and confusing would be an understatement. Defendants have responded to the last revision by saying they oppose restoring Brand as a defendant but otherwise do not object to filing the revised "Third Amended Civil Rights Complaint and Jury Demand." Defendants add, however, that they would like to know at some point which version of the complaint requires a response.
In considering these matters, the court keeps in mind both the rule that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), as well as the course of prior lawsuits by plaintiff Srivastava against Indiana University, including the unusual award of attorneys' fees and costs against plaintiff and the need to strike numerous frivolous and scandalous filings by plaintiff.
In Srivastava v. Indiana University, IP 97-704-C M/S ("Srivastava I"), Judge McKinney granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims arising from Srivastava's employment on the faculty of the IU School of Medicine, her failure to win tenure, and the non-renewal of her contract. In Srivastava v. Indiana University, IP 98-242-C H/G ("Srivastava II"), the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims and ordered Srivastava to pay IU attorneys' fees and expenses of more than $28,000 because she had unreasonably prolonged the litigation and had continued to file scandalous and irrelevant materials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award of fees and expenses, Srivastava v. Trustees of Indiana University, 2000 WL 975172 (7th Cir. July 11, 2000), and the Supreme Court denied Srivastava's petition for a writ of certiorari, 121 S.Ct. 624 (2000).
The court hereby GRANTS plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint and directs the clerk of the court to file and docket as of this date the revised "Third Amended Civil Rights Complaint and Jury Demand" attached as Exhibit A to the "Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend Complaint." Absent extraordinary circumstances, however, it is highly unlikely that any further substantive amendment of the complaint will be allowed in this case. Defendants are entitled at this point to have a stable complaint to which to respond. Defendants shall respond to the revised "Third Amended Civil Rights Complaint and Jury Demand" no later than June 1, 2001.
The court DISMISSES, however, the claims against Brand asserted in the revised "Third Amended Civil Rights Complaint" because Srivastava had previously dropped claims against him and the court dismissed them at her own request. In Srivastava II and in this case, this plaintiff has constantly changed her claims, tactics, and targets. This approach to litigation has inflicted unnecessary work and expense on the defendants and has multiplied the proceedings. The requirements of justice, which must be considered under Rule 15(a), do not require any further indulgence of these on-again, off-again tactics, even for a pro se litigant. Plaintiff dismissed her claims against Brand in this case, and she can and should be held to her decision.
On its own motion, the court also STRIKES from the revised Third Amended Complaint the prayers for relief in Paragraphs 36(d) (seeking an order to the IU trustees to remove six individuals from their university positions), 36(e) (seeking an order to the trustees to order Bepko to pay from his funds the $28,370.83 that this court ordered plaintiff to pay IU in Srivastava II), and 36(f) (seeking an order to the trustees to "hire plaintiff as Chancellor of IUPUI upon her completion of her law degree"). These requests are frivolous on the face of the pleading and are further symptoms of the problems in this series of cases.
Plaintiff's "motion for sanctions and to strike impertinent statements" included as part of plaintiff's reply brief in support of her first motion to amend the complaint (Docket No. 30, filed February 2, 2001) is also denied. There is no such basis for sanctions, and plaintiff cannot complain about the fact that former defendant Bepko answered her complaint, even though his answer and this court's order granting leave to amend the complaint to remove Bepko as a defendant crossed in the mail. . .
II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Dr. Srivastava has also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. She seeks an order: (a) sealing Indiana University's records of her employment and enjoining IU's agents "from communicating any information contained therein to anyone"; (b) directing IU to prohibit several officials from "discussing or otherwise communicating about plaintiff" with anyone connected with the Indiana University School of Law — Indianapolis, to which plaintiff has applied for admission; (c) directing IU to remove any materials from the files of the law school placed there by certain university officials; and (d) ordering IU "to ensure that plaintiff's application for admission to IU School of Law — Indianapolis receives a fair assessment based on plaintiff's real qualifications."
Plaintiff has not supported her motion for preliminary injunction with any affidavits or other evidence. Even taking factual statements in her brief at face value, plaintiff has not actually shown any reasonable likelihood of imminent irreparable harm or a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of her claim. Her motion seeks to have the court intervene in an ongoing admissions process at the law school because of her unsupported and speculative fear that her application will not be considered fairly. There is no demonstrated need for such relief.
In addition, plaintiff's motion seeks to seal university records and to silence university officials on matters of public record — records that are public as a result of plaintiff's litigation in Srivastava I and Srivastava II. It would be a distortion of the court's equitable powers to issue an order that allowed one party to a prolonged and bitter controversy to say whatever she wished on the subject while silencing those against whom she has leveled serious accusations. The distortion would be even greater in a case like this one, where those accusations have been dismissed as unfounded by the courts. These points are apparent without a hearing, and the court sees no need for such a hearing on plaintiff's frivolous motion for a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is hereby denied.
So ordered.