ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of assault in the second degree shall run concurrently with the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of murder in the second degree; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant has not preserved for appellate review his contention that the trial court's charge was improper with respect to its definition of reasonable doubt as "a doubt for which a reason can be given" (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Jackson, 76 N.Y.2d 908, 909). In any event, this contention is without merit (see, People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251-252; People v. Durkin, 200 A.D.2d 684; 1 CJI[NY] 6.20).
However, as the People correctly concede, the imposition of consecutive sentences was improper under the circumstances of this case (see, Penal Law § 70.25; People v. Yong Yun Lee, 92 N.Y.2d 987; People v. Ahedo, 229 A.D.2d 588; People v. Fonseca, 229 A.D.2d 591).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.