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STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent v. NATHANIEL JACOB HAUX, Appellant.

DENNIS J. SWEENEY, J.

Nathaniel Haux helped beat a transient to death. A jury found him guilty of second degree murder. He assigns error to the court's denial of his motion to suppress a pre-arrest incriminating statement, the admission of certain physical evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. We find no merit in any of the assignments of error and affirm.

FACTS

John Bock was attacked in downtown Spokane on September 12, 1998. He reported the incident from a nearby store. Police and paramedics found Mr. Bock extremely intoxicated, but his injuries appeared to be minor. He seemed most concerned about having lost his glasses during the assault. He described his attackers variously as four black men or three white men. He was vague about the precise location of the attack. An officer made a search of the immediate area, but failed to find any glasses. Mr. Bock was taken to a hospital where he died from his injuries on September 14. The police then conducted an intensive search of the nearby alleys to locate evidence of a crime scene. They found a pair of glasses and hat. Hairs on the hat were consistent with Mr. Bock's, but a definite identification could not be made.

A year later, Spokane police telephoned Nathaniel Haux in Portland, Oregon, and arranged to meet him in a Portland tavern suggested by Mr. Haux. Mr. Haux was then 17 years old.

Mr. Haux arrived at the tavern with two friends who were present but out of earshot during the interview. The two investigators told Mr. Haux several times that he would not be arrested that day but would be allowed to leave with his friends and the officers would fly back to Spokane. Mr. Haux said he understood that. They did not read him his Miranda rights. Mr. Haux appeared clear-headed, not intoxicated, and understood what was being said.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).

Mr. Haux admitted that he and three other `street kids' had attacked a man in a Spokane alley in September 1998. He had followed newspaper reports over the next several days and learned that the transient had died from his injuries. He recognized the details in the paper and knew it was the same incident he had been involved in. Mr. Haux told the investigators that he had not noticed whether his victim had a beard.

The officers conceded that, at some point during this interview, it became clear to them that Mr. Haux would eventually be arrested for the Bock murder.

Mr. Haux was subsequently arrested on an unrelated matter and brought back to Spokane. While in custody, he was advised of his rights and made another statement about the killing. He led investigators to the scene of the assault in the same alley and 80 to 90 feet from where the glasses and hat were found. The officers took pains not to lead Mr. Haux to the crime scene, but to have him lead them. They eventually charged him with the second degree felony murder of Mr. Bock.

Mr. Haux moved to suppress his first confession. He did not testify at his CrR 3.5 hearing and presented no evidence. His counsel argued that the police deliberately led Mr. Haux to believe they had no interest in prosecuting him for the crime and he could talk with impunity. His statement was thus obtained by deception and was involuntary. The court found that Mr. Haux was not in custody in Portland and that there was neither deception nor misunderstanding. The court concluded the confession was voluntary and admissible.

At his jury trial, Mr. Haux's defense was that the State could not prove the transient he attacked was Mr. Bock but rather a different person who failed to report it.

The court sustained a defense objection to the relevancy of the hat found in the vicinity a couple of days after the assault. The court found insufficient foundation tying it to the crime. Then the State called a Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory forensic scientist who identified the hat as the one he had examined for evidence. He had compared hairs recovered from it with Mr. Bock's hair. The court then admitted the hat into evidence for the purposes of that testimony.

The court also admitted the glasses. The court found sufficient relevance based on prior evidence that Mr. Bock was wearing glasses with similar frames the day before the assault and that Mr. Bock lost his glasses during the assault near where these were found. The court ruled the defense objection went to weight not admissibility. Later, the court admitted photographs of the hat and glasses and clarified its ruling that the items were admitted for all purposes.

The only witness presented by Mr. Haux was codefendant Isaiah Ridley. Mr. Ridley's description of the incident was consistent with Mr. Haux's statements. He testified that Mr. Haux had admitted striking the transient with a `smiley,' a heavy chain with a padlock on the end.

Although Mr. Bock had red hair and a thick beard, Mr. Ridley recalled their victim as a man with gray hair and did not recall a beard or glasses. However, Mr. Ridley testified that the victim was doubled over by the first blow to the back of the head with a bottle, and conceded the hat and glasses might have fallen off before the victim straightened up and Mr. Ridley hit him in the face with another bottle. Mr. Ridley admitted he was under the influence of methamphetamine, marijuana, and possibly acid at the time of the attack. He had pleaded guilty to the first degree manslaughter of Mr. Bock based on the same facts. Mr. Haux was convicted and received a standard sentence.

DISCUSSION

The Portland confession was voluntary and admissible. In reviewing findings of fact entered following a motion to suppress, we review only those facts to which error is assigned. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Generally, we accept the findings as verities if there is substantial evidence to support them. Id. at 644. We review conclusions of law entered in suppression proceedings de novo. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).

Mr. Haux does not assign error to the court's CrR 3.5 findings of facts, which are therefore verities. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 130, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).

An incriminating statement made outside of a custodial setting is voluntary and admissible if it is spontaneous, unsolicited, and not obtained by inducement or compulsion. State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 484, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985). A confession is not voluntary if the interrogating officers' behavior overcame the suspect's will to resist. The police conduct need not be shocking. Any `direct or implied promise, however slight,' may render a confession involuntary. State v. Forrester, 21 Wn. App. 855, 863, 587 P.2d 179 (1978). Factors to be considered in evaluating voluntariness include the age, intelligence, and experience of the defendant. State v. Baker, 4 Wn. App. 121, 126, 480 P.2d 778 (1971) (citing State v. Prater, 77 Wn.2d 526, 534, 463 P.2d 640 (1970)). When the defendant is very young, the court must evaluate the police conduct in light of his or her particular strengths and weaknesses. State v. Riley, 17 Wn. App. 732, 735, 565 P.2d 105 (1977).

Mr. Haux was 17 years old at the time of the first interview. He contends the police conduct in the Portland tavern met the minimal threshold of unlawful inducement sufficient to overcome his will to resist talking to them. He contends the court paid insufficient attention to the relevant factors including his age, intelligence, and experience. Forrester, 21 Wn. App. at 863. He contends he was repeatedly assured that the police had no intention of arresting him, while all the time they subjectively knew they would eventually arrest him. In the totality of the circumstances, he argues, this implied promise rendered his statements involuntary and required the court to suppress them. Mr. Haux contends that, because of his youth and inexperience, he misunderstood the assurances that he was not to be arrested that day and believed he was being offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for his statement.

Mr. Haux did not testify at the CrR 3.5 hearing and presented no witnesses. The only evidence was the testimony of the two detectives. Both testified that they repeatedly told Mr. Haux that he was not in custody, and would not be taken into custody that day. The CrR 3.5 record supports the court's findings that Mr. Haux was sober and able to understand what was going on, and that he did in fact understand. Nothing in the record suggests that the detectives communicated to Mr. Haux, directly or indirectly, intentionally or accidentally, assurances that he would not be arrested at some future time. The CrR 3.5 findings support the conclusion that the Portland statement was voluntary. The court did take into account Mr. Haux's age.

The glasses, hat, and photographs were properly admitted. After he was attacked, Mr. Bock stumbled into a convenience store. He was able only to wave in the general direction of the place where he had been set upon.

The officer made a brief search for Mr. Bock's glasses, but thought he was helping out the victim of an apparent simple assault with minor injuries, not looking for evidence of a homicide. After Mr. Bock died a couple of days later, investigators made a thorough search of the alleys nearby and found the glasses and hat.

If they were Mr. Bock's, the glasses and hat established the crime scene as a particular alley. Mr. Haux admitted to assaulting a transient in that same alley. Mr. Haux contends the court erroneously admitted the glasses and hat contrary to ER 402 because there was insufficient foundation tying the glasses and hat either to Mr. Bock, the assault, or Mr. Haux.

The court sustained the defense objection to admission of the hat.

The court did admit photographs of the alley believed to be the crime scene, some of which included the glasses and hat. The court rejected two photographs of the hat taken at the police station until the State presented evidence linking it to the crime.

The State then called a Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory forensic scientist who identified the case number and his own initials on the plastic bag containing the hat. The witness identified the hat as the one he had examined and from which he had taken hair samples for comparison with Mr. Bock's. The court then admitted the hat into evidence `for purposes of the officer's testimony.' Report of Proceedings at 208.

During testimony about the hair evidence, the forensic expert was asked to hold up the hat and show the jury. The court overruled the defense objection that the hat was not in evidence.

The forensic expert pronounced the known Bock hair and the hat hair `similar.' The upshot of the expert's testimony was that the hairs on the hat could have come from Mr. Bock's head, and cuts in the hat could have been made by a bottle being smashed over it.

Based on evidence that Mr. Bock wore glasses and lost them in the area, the court admitted the glasses unconditionally.

Standard of review.

We review evidentiary decisions for manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 399, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997); State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). The threshold for relevance is low, and the court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission of evidence. City of Kennewick v. Day, 142 Wn.2d 1, 8, 11 P.3d 304 (2000); State v. Rice, 48 Wn. App. 7, 11, 737 P.2d 726 (1987).

The weight of the hat and glasses is debatable. But the defense was free to point this out to the jury, and the jury was free to discount them. However, the court was within its broad discretion in ruling that this physical evidence sufficiently tended to support the State's theory of the case to meet the threshold of relevance for admissibility. We find no error.

The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977); State v. Lopez, 79 Wn. App. 755, 768, 904 P.2d 1179 (1995). The verdict will be upheld unless no reasonable jury could have found each element proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980); State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 596-97, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995); State v. Denison, 78 Wn. App. 566, 570, 897 P.2d 437 (1995). Only the trier of fact weighs the evidence and judges the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308, 789 P.2d 306 (1989).

Mr. Haux argues that the State failed to prove that he assaulted Mr. Bock. Even viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the verdict, he contends it does no more than connect him to the glasses and hat, which could have come from anywhere. The evidence does not connect either the glasses and hat or Mr. Haux to Mr. Bock. Mr. Haux points to the police testimony that transient assaults happen at least once per shift, and are often unreported. Mr. Bock unquestionably had red hair and a full red beard. Mr. Haux told investigators and Mr. Ridley testified that they thought the man they attacked had grayish hair and they did not notice facial hair. Mr. Haux contends the evidence is equally consistent with two unrelated assaults.

However, based on the evidence, the jury could have found that Mr. Haux beat up someone at the same time and in the same place where Mr. Bock was attacked; that Mr. Haux himself recognized the description of his victim and the location of his crime in the newspaper accounts of Mr. Bock's death; that Mr. Bock wore glasses similar to those found near the place where Mr. Haux admitted assaulting a man; that Mr. Bock's confusion about the appearance of his attackers was explained by the darkness of the alley, the beating, and his blood alcohol level of .40 percent; and that Mr. Ridley's description of the victim was unreliable because Mr. Ridley was under the influence of several drugs. Mr. Ridley's testimony was also undermined by the fact that he himself pleaded guilty to killing Mr. Bock based on the same facts.

Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Mr. Haux guilty.

The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR: KURTS, C.J., SCHULTHEIS, J.

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STATE v. HAUX, 19216-4-III (Wash.App. 5-24-2001)
(May 24, 2001)