ORDERED that the order entered September 23, 1999, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the orders entered October 20, 1999, and December 13, 1999, are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
"To invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the court must determine that the party's failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3216; Harris v. City of New York, 211 A.D.2d 663, 664; Lestingi v. City of New York, 209 A.D.2d 384)" (Martignetti v. Ricevuto, 271 A.D.2d 508, 509). It is also well settled that the determination whether or not to strike a pleading lies within the sound discretion of the court (see, Zletz v. Wetanson, 67 N.Y.2d 711; Kubacaka v. Town of North Hempstead, 240 A.D.2d 374).
It is clear that both sides are partially at fault for the highly contentious and seemingly unending discovery in this case. Under these circumstances, and considering the record as a whole, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion and cross motion to strike the defendants' answer for failure to comply with various discovery requests (see, Payne v. Rouse Corp., 269 A.D.2d 510).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, FEUERSTEIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.