WILLIAM B. SHUBB, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Aaron Courtright ("Courtright") sues defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") for breach of contract. Wal-Mart moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 5, 1989, Courtright became an employee of Wal-Mart. (See Courtright Decl. ¶ 3). In February 1995, Courtright was told that he would be terminated for failing to meet his sales quota, and on February 17, 1995, he resigned. (See Pl.'s Ex. A, Courtright's Exit Interview; see also Courtright Decl. ¶ 4). In February 1996, Courtright filed a complaint against Wal-Mart alleging wrongful termination and defamation. See Aaron Courtright v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ-S-96-0713 EJG. On November 6, 1996, that matter was resolved with the execution of a Confidential Settlement Agreement and General Release ("settlement agreement"). (See Def.'s Ex. A). Included as a part of the settlement agreement was an attached reference letter listing Courtright's dates of employment, position title, job responsibilities, and final rate of pay. (See id.).
Courtright was actually an employee of Sam's Club, a division of Wal-Mart. For convenience all references will be to Wal-Mart.
Additionally, the settlement agreement provided that any third party inquiries regarding Courtright's employment with Wal-Mart should be directed to the personnel manager, who was to limit his or her comments to the information contained in the reference letter. (See Def.'s Ex. A). The settlement agreement further provided that Wal-Mart would not release Courtright's personnel file without a subpoena or court order. (See id.).
It is unclear from the face of the settlement agreement whether it was Courtright or Wal-Mart that was obligated to direct third party inquiries to the personnel manager.
Between November 1996 and early 2000, Courtright applied for employment with five law enforcement agencies ("the agencies"). As a part of the application process, Courtright executed a general release and request for information with each agency. (See Pl.'s Undisputed Facts # 8). The court has been provided with copies of the forms Courtright executed with two of those agencies. The first form is the one he filled out for the Portland Bureau of Police ("PBP"). It contains the following language:
Specifically, Courtright sought employment with the Los Angeles Police Department, the Anchorage Police Department, the Contra Costa Sheriff's Department, the Portland Bureau of Police, and the Sacramento Police Department.
I hereby authorize and direct you, your organization, its officers, agents, assigns, and employees to release any and all information which you may possess about me, including information which may be deemed confidential, privileged and/or derogatory in nature, including, but not limited to: employment information, official employment documents, employment performance data, internal investigations, discipline, including information which may, as a result of any agreement between the undersigned and your organization, have been sealed; character reference information; background investigations; educational records and transcripts; credit and financial records; and local criminal history information pursuant to State Law.
I hereby exonerate, release and discharge you, your organization, its officers, agents, assigns and employees from any liability or damages, whether in law or in equity, now and in the future, for complying with this request and for furnishing the information requested by the bearer of this authorization form.
(Def.'s Ex. F).
By its terms and the context, this form was obviously intended to be sent to Courtright's previous employers, such as Wal-Mart. The form not only authorizes, but directs, the employer to release all employment information, and it further releases and discharges the employer from any liability for doing so.
The second form which has been provided to the court is the one Courtright filled out for the Anchorage Police Department ("APD"). It contains the following language:
To: Wal-Mart
Authority to Release Information: I am an applicant for the position of police officer with the Municipality of Anchorage, Anchorage Police Department. I respectfully request and authorize you to furnish the Anchorage Police Department any and all information that you have concerning me, including but not limited to former employment, such as my work records, school records, attendance records, my evaluations, my performance and training records, my reputation, employer investigations, civil or criminal information, my financial records and any other positive/negative information relating to me. This information is to be used to assist the Anchorage Police Department in determining my qualifications and fitness for the position I am seeking. . . .
Waiver of Liability: I release the organization named above [Wal-Mart]. . . . and all individuals giving or receiving this information from any liability or damage whatsoever which may result from furnishing the requested information. I will hold the above named individual/organization . . . completely harmless. This authority to release information and waive liabilities supersedes any previous verbal or written agreements or contracts.
Like the PBP form, the APD form also requests the prior employer to furnish the agency with all employment information (whether positive or negative) and releases such employer from all liability for doing so.
Although the court has not been provided with actual copies of the forms Courtright filled out for the other agencies, Courtright admits in his statement of undisputed facts that the remaining releases contain language similar to that found in the APD release. (See Def.'s Ex. E; see also Pl.'s Undisputed Facts # 10 11).
Courtright also provided each agency with the names of his supervisors at Wal-Mart, pursuant to instructions on the applications. (See Courtright Decl. ¶ 5). Courtright was not hired by any of the agencies.
On January 4, 2000, Courtright filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento, case number 00AS00034, alleging breach of contract. In his complaint Courtright specifically alleges that Wal-Mart breached the settlement agreement by releasing information regarding Courtright's work history without a subpoena and by making "untrue and defamatory" statements to certain potential employers. (See Def.'s Ex. C, Compl. ¶ 5). On March 2, 2000, Wal-Mart removed the action to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. On April 12, 2000, after briefing by the parties, this court confirmed jurisdiction.
Wal-Mart now moves for summary judgment on alternative grounds, either: (1) the releases, executed by Courtright, extinguish any of defendant's obligations under the settlement agreement; or (2) Courtright has failed to present any admissible evidence to support his claim.
Because the court resolves the matter based on these arguments, the court need not address defendant's arguments regarding privilege and plaintiff's inability to prove damages.
II. Discussion
The court must grant summary judgment to a moving party "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party adverse to a motion for summary judgment may not simply deny generally the pleadings of the movant; the adverse party must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Simply put, "a summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The non-moving party must show more than a mere "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Because this matter is before the court based on diversity jurisdiction, California's substantive law applies. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
A. Releases
A release is the abandonment, relinquishment, or surrender of a known right or claim, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced, operating to extinguish a cause of action. See Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 711 (1945). "In general, a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release's terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence." Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366 (1996).
Plaintiff makes no allegation of fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. (See Pl.'s Undisputed Fact # 23; see also Def.'s Ex. C, Compl.). The PBP release contains express language authorizing plaintiff's former employers to release "any and all information which you may possess about [plaintiff],. . . ." (Def.'s Ex. F). The APD release contains similar language, authorizing plaintiff's former employers to release "any and all information that you have concerning [plaintiff] . . .," and plaintiff admits in his statement of undisputed facts that the releases for the remaining agencies contain similar language. (See Pl.'s Undisputed Facts # 10 11). Thus, pursuant to the express language in all of the releases, plaintiff authorized defendant to give to the agencies any and all information in defendant's possession, relating to plaintiff and his employment.
More than just an authorization, these releases were formal requests for any and all information in defendant's possession, relating to plaintiff, to be given to the agencies. By executing these releases plaintiff waived those provisions of the prior settlement agreement that limited the information that defendant could relay to the agencies. Defendant not only had the right to rely on these requests as authorization to give out any and all information relating to the plaintiff, but indeed had a duty to comply with them. Consequently, defendant's obligations under the settlement agreement were extinguished, and plaintiff cannot now sue defendant for complying with his request. See Skrbina, 45 Cal.App.4th at 1366 (a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release's terms).
Plaintiff argues, that he "never intended to waive the Settlement Agreement." This argument is unavailing. Plaintiff cannot rely on his unspoken intentions not to waive the terms of the settlement agreement, despite express language in the releases to the contrary, in order to escape the effect of the releases. See Skrbina, 45 Cal.App.4th at 1367.
The PEP release contains language specifically authorizing the release of any and all information, including "information which may, as a result of any agreement between the undersigned and your organization, have been sealed; . . ." (Def.'s Ex. F). Furthermore, plaintiff does not dispute that each of the remaining releases contain language similar to the APD release, which by its terms expressly "supersedes any previous verbal or written agreements or contracts." (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts # 10 11).
Finally, plaintiff's argument that he would not "intentionally release Wal-Mart from its obligations under the settlement agreement after filing suit to obtain such promises," is contradicted by the fact that he voluntarily signed the releases. Thus, despite whatever unspoken intentions plaintiff may have harbored to the contrary, defendant's obligations under the settlement agreement were extinguished when plaintiff executed the releases.
B. Evidence of Breach
Even if the releases executed by plaintiff did not extinguish defendant's obligations under the settlement agreement, plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to support his allegation that defendant breached the agreement. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (Finding that the moving party can succeed on a motion for summary judgment by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.)
Plaintiff offers the following evidence as proof of defendant's breach: (1) the rejection letter from the PBP; (2) the application suspension letter, apparently from the LAPD; and (3) plaintiff's own handwritten notes dated August 31 and September 30, 1999, and May 9, 2001, purporting to describe phone conversations plaintiff had with various member of the LAPD and the PBP.
Plaintiff has also attached an employment rejection letter from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as letters from the FBI and the City of Oakland, each discussing plaintiff's status in their respective application processes. It is not clear why these are attached, and plaintiff makes no reference to any of them in his papers.
First, the court cannot discern how the letter from the PBP is evidence of a breach by defendant. The letter merely states: "We regret to inform you that you have not received a qualifying evaluation on the Personal History Investigation phase of the examination for Community Police Officer." (Pl.'s Ex. C). Nowhere in the letter is there a reference to problems with plaintiff's previous employment, relayed by defendant or any other individual or organization.
Second, the application suspension letter from the LAPD establishes nothing. It simply states: "You need to show us that you have maintained a good employment record since your resignation in lieu of termination from [Wal-Mart] in February 1995." (Pl.'s Ex. C). Nothing in the letter suggests that defendant provided the LAPD with the information that plaintiff resigned from Wal-Mart in lieu of termination.
Plaintiff argues that because his personnel file from Wal-Mart reflects only a voluntary termination, and he did not give the information to the LAPD, it could only have been received from defendant. It would be pure speculation for the court to draw such an inference. For example, the court notes that plaintiff sued defendant for wrongful termination in 1996 and thus, any papers relating to that case would be a matter of public record. It is just as likely that the information could have been gathered there. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 ("A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.").
Further, even assuming that defendant did provide the LAPD with this information, plaintiff offers no evidence to support his claim that the information is false. See id. To the contrary, plaintiff's own evidence, submitted in support of his opposition to this motion, belies his allegation of falsity. In his declaration plaintiff states: "I was told in February, 1995 that I would be terminated from my position for not meeting my sales quota." (Courtright Decl. ¶ 4). Then, on February 17, 1995, plaintiff resigned, all of which suggests that defendant did in fact resign from defendant's employ, in lieu of termination. (See Pl.'s Ex. A, Courtright's Exit Interview; see also Courtright Decl. ¶ 3).
Third, plaintiff's handwritten notes, which he claims describe conversations that he had with various members of the PBP and the LAPD, do not support his claims. (See Pl.'s Ex. D). Moreover, they are inadmissible hearsay and therefore he cannot rely on them at trial, or in this motion. See Fed.R.Evid. 801; see also Lust v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 89 F.3d 594, 598 (A moving party can sustain its burden on a motion for summary judgment by showing that the evidence on which the nonmoving party is relying to prove a crucial element of its case is inadmissible.). Accordingly, plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to support his claim that defendant breached the settlement agreement.
C. Attorney's Fees
The settlement agreement provides that "[s]hould any litigation commence between the parties to this Agreement concerning this Agreement or EMPLOYEE's employment, the prevailing party in such litigation shall be entitled, in addition to such other relief as may be granted, to a reasonable sum for its attorney's fees as shall be determined by the court." (Def.'s Ex. A ¶ 13). Thus, as the prevailing party, defendant appears to be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. At oral argument defendant's counsel stated his intent to file a separate motion for attorney's fees, thus the court need not decide the matter at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.