ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Prior written notice of an alleged defective condition in a parking field is a condition precedent to commencing a personal injury action against a municipal defendant (see, LaRosa v. Town of Hempstead, 237 A.D.2d 579; Mendes v. Whitney-Floral Realty Corp., 216 A.D.2d 540; Stratton v. City of Beacon, 91 A.D.2d 1018). Under Town of Hempstead Code 6-1, no civil action shall be maintained for damages sustained by reason of any defective highway condition, including one allegedly existing in a parking field, unless prior written notice of such condition is served upon the Town (see, LaRosa v. Town of Hempstead, supra; Mendes v. Whitney-Floral Realty Corp., supra; Stratton v. City of Beacon, supra).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that he failed to plead or prove prior written notice. A generalized complaint about the parking field more than a year before the incident did not place the Town on notice of the instant alleged defect (see generally, Damante v. Town of Hempstead, 227 A.D.2d 433). Moreover, the description in the plaintiff's notice of claim, which was rejected by the Town, failed to describe the accident location with sufficient particularity (see, Markotsis v. Town of Oyster Bay, 261 A.D.2d 451; Earle v. Town of Oyster Bay, 247 A.D.2d 357; Thomas v. Town of Oyster Bay, 190 A.D.2d 731).