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Docket Number

No. 3-00-0369

Attorney(S)

Victoria A. Boone (argued), of Law Offices of Edward R. Jaquays, of Joliet, for appellant. Roy A. Sabuco (argued) and Michael Renzi, both of Snyder, Sabuco Beck, P.C., of Joliet, for appellee.

Judges

JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: In re Marriage of Dawn A. Snow

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties' Judgment of Dissolution was entered on February 27, 1998. Under that Judgment, respondent William A. Snow was ordered to pay petitioner Dawn A. Snow $1,800 per month in maintenance until May 31, 1999, with a reduced schedule thereafter as set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The settlement agreement also provided that "maintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of court."

On May 14, 1999, William filed a petition to terminate maintenance alleging that Dawn had been engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime Littrell between August 1997 and February 1999. At the termination hearing, Jaime testified that he moved into Dawn's home in 1997, initially did not pay rent, began paying $300 per month in March 1998, split utilities and groceries, performed yard and pool maintenance, and had sexual relations with Dawn three to four times per week during the year and a half they lived together. Jaime also admitted secretly videotaping one sexual encounter.

Dawn testified that Jaime lived with her for a year and a half as a temporary favor, denied a regular sexual relationship (admitting only one sexual encounter in January 1999 after drinking), stated Jaime never paid rent or mortgage, and that they did not commingle finances or share credit obligations. She admitted socializing two to three times a month with Jaime, exchanging gifts, and that Jaime sometimes contributed to groceries, gas, or pool chemicals.

The trial court found Jaime's testimony more credible, concluded Dawn engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship within the meaning of the statute, terminated William's maintenance obligation effective the date he filed his petition, and ordered Dawn to reimburse William for overpayments. Dawn appealed the finding of a continuing conjugal relationship; William cross-appealed the trial court's choice of effective termination date.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in finding that Dawn engaged in a "resident, continuing, conjugal" relationship with Jaime Littrell such that maintenance termination is justified under 750 ILCS 5/510(c).
Whether maintenance, once properly terminable due to conjugal cohabitation, should be terminated retroactively to the date the cohabitation began rather than to the date the petition to terminate maintenance was filed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Appellant (Dawn A. Snow)

Argued that the trial court erred in finding she engaged in a continuing, conjugal relationship with Jaime and therefore maintenance should not have been terminated.
On cross-appeal issues, argued that the settlement agreement's language ("maintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of the court") created a separate agreement precluding application of the Act's "conjugal cohabitation" provision; alternatively, she argued the Gray decision (which treats the triggering date as the start of cohabitation) fails to follow settled Illinois law.

Respondent-Appellee (William A. Snow)

Alleged in his petition that Dawn engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime between August 1997 and February 1999 and sought termination of maintenance.
On cross-appeal, argued the trial court erred by terminating maintenance effective the filing date of his petition rather than retroactively to the date the conjugal cohabitation began (citing In re Marriage of Gray).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re Marriage of Leming, 227 Ill. App.3d 154, 590 N.E.2d 1027 (1992)	To prove a continuing, conjugal relationship, an ex-spouse must show a de facto husband-and-wife relationship.	The court used Leming as the foundational definition of what constitutes a continuing conjugal relationship to assess the evidence presented.
In re the Marriage of Herrin, 262 Ill. App.3d 573, 634 N.E.2d 1168 (1994)	Enumerated factors courts examine to determine a de facto marital relationship: length of relationship; amount of time spent together; nature of activities; interrelation of personal affairs; vacations together; holidays together.	The court applied the Herrin factors (length of relationship, activities, shared household tasks, gifts, socialization) in evaluating whether a de facto husband-wife relationship existed.
In re Jones, 285 Ill. App.3d 8, 673 N.E.2d 703 (1996)	A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court's factual findings because the trial court is best positioned to weigh witness credibility.	The court deferred to the trial court's credibility determinations (finding Jaime more credible than Dawn) pursuant to Jones.
In re Marriage of Caradonna, 197 Ill. App.3d 155, 553 N.E.2d 1161 (1990)	A court of review will not reverse a trial court's finding concerning a de facto relationship unless that finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.	The court held that the trial court's finding of a de facto husband-wife relationship was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and therefore affirmed that aspect of the judgment.
In re Marriage of Gray, 314 Ill. App.3d 249, 731 N.E.2d 942 (2000)	Holds that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjugal cohabitation began, not when the petition to terminate maintenance is filed.	The court agreed with Gray, rejected Dawn's argument that the settlement agreement prevented application of the statute, found that Gray governed the appropriate triggering date, and remanded for determination of the actual start date of cohabitation so maintenance can be terminated as of that date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory basis for termination of maintenance: 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1998), which terminates future maintenance if the recipient "cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis," unless otherwise agreed in writing in the judgment. The court rejected Dawn's argument that the settlement agreement's language limited termination to only completion of scheduled payments or court order, explaining the settlement language did not preclude application of the statute.

To determine whether a resident, continuing conjugal relationship existed the court applied established Illinois authority. It noted Leming's requirement that a de facto husband-and-wife relationship be shown and applied the multi-factor Herrin test (length of relationship, amount of time spent together, nature of activities, interrelation of personal affairs, vacations, holidays).

The court reviewed the evidentiary record: Dawn and Jaime lived together for approximately a year and a half; they socialized frequently, engaged in dating-type activities, exchanged gifts, split household chores and some household expenses or contributions, and Jaime testified to sexual relations three to four times weekly (while Dawn denied a sustained sexual relationship except for one incident). The trial court found Jaime's testimony more credible than Dawn's.

Applying the Herrin factors to the credited facts and affording deference to the trial court's credibility determinations under Jones, the court concluded the totality of circumstances supported a finding of a de facto husband-wife relationship. Because that finding was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (per Caradonna), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that Dawn engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship and therefore that maintenance was terminable under the statute.

On the cross-appeal concerning the effective date for termination, the court considered and agreed with the holding in Gray that the triggering period for termination is the time the conjugal cohabitation began, not the date the petition was filed. The court therefore concluded the trial court erred by terminating maintenance effective the filing date of the petition and remanded for the trial court to determine the date cohabitation began and to terminate maintenance effective that date.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that Dawn engaged in a resident, continuing, conjugal relationship with Jaime Littrell and that maintenance was terminable under 750 ILCS 5/510(c). The appellate court remanded, however, for the trial court to determine the actual date the cohabitation began and to terminate maintenance effective that date (rather than the date the petition was filed).

Implications:

The direct effect on the parties is that William's petition to terminate maintenance was properly granted, but the trial court must determine the start date of Dawn's cohabitation with Jaime and adjust the effective termination date accordingly (and the reimbursement calculation consistent with that date).
The court rejected Dawn's contention that the marital settlement language insulated maintenance from statutory termination for conjugal cohabitation; the statutory provision in 750 ILCS 5/510(c) applies unless otherwise expressly agreed in writing in the judgment (and the court found no such limiting agreement here).
The opinion follows and applies existing Illinois appellate authority (Leming, Herrin, Jones, Caradonna, Gray) rather than announcing a new legal rule; the decision primarily applies established precedent to the facts of this case. No new precedent beyond application of Gray's triggering-date rule is articulated by this opinion.

Disposition: Judgment of the circuit court of Will County affirmed in part and remanded in part. (Affirmed in part; remanded in part.)

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In Re: MARRIAGE OF DAWN A. SNOW, Petitioner-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. WILLIAM A. SNOW Respondent-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

The petitioner, Dawn A. Snow, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Will County terminating her right to receive maintenance from the respondent, William A. Snow. On appeal, Dawn contends that the trial court erred in finding that she engaged in a continuing, conjugal relationship with another man. On cross-appeal, William argues that the trial court erred in terminating maintenance from the date of his petition rather than the date the cohabitation began. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order granting William's petition. However, we remand this cause for the trial court to determine when Dawn began the cohabitation and to terminate her payments as of that date.

The record reflects that the Judgment of Dissolution was entered on February 27, 1998. In the Judgment, William was ordered to pay $1,800.00 per month in maintenance to Dawn until May 31, 1999. Thereafter, a reduced amount of maintenance was to be paid pursuant to a schedule set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The terms of the marital settlement agreement, which were incorporated into the Judgment of Dissolution, also stated that "maintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of court."

On May 14, 1999, William filed a petition to terminate maintenance. In the petition, William alleged that Dawn had been engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime Littrell between August 1997 and February 1999.

At the hearing on the petition, Jaime Littrell testified that sometime in 1997 he was living with his mother who was preparing to move out of state. At that time, Dawn invited him to move into her home. Jaime moved into Dawn's son's old room.

Jaime testified that when he moved into her home, Dawn told him that he did not need to initially pay rent because her husband was paying the mortgage. However, she said that in March 1998 he would have to pay her $300 per month. Jaime said that they had an agreement to split the cost of utilities and groceries. He also maintained the lawn and the pool.

According to Jaime, in March 1998 he began paying rent. He paid the rent in cash because he had no checking account. He said Dawn gave him receipts for the payments, but he was unable to produce any receipts at the hearing.

Jaime also testified that he and Dawn had sexual relations three to four times a week during the year and a half that they lived together. Further, he admitted that on one occasion he secretly videotaped them having sexual relations without Dawn's consent. He described their relationship during that time as "sex partners."

Dawn testified that Jaime lived in her home for a year and a half. She said that she allowed Jaime to live in her home because he had no place to live after his mother moved out of state. According to Dawn, she only offered him one of her bedrooms until he got himself "up on his feet." During that time, he never paid her any rent or contributed toward her mortgage payments. She said Jaime paid for his own groceries and telephone charges but sometimes he would give her money for food, gas, and chemicals for the pool. She also said Jaime did some yard work and work around the pool.

Dawn admitted that while they lived together, she and Jaime socialized about two to three times a month for dinner, a movie, or drinks. They sometimes went out with her friends, but never with his. They exchanged Christmas and birthday presents.

Dawn denied any sexual relationship with Jaime. However, she admitted that they had sexual relations in January 1999 after they had been out together and she had had too much to drink. Finally, Dawn noted that during the time Jaime resided in her home he never paid for any of her personal expenses, they did not co-mingle their funds, and they owned no joint credit cards.

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that Jaime's testimony was more credible than Dawn's. Therefore, it found that William established that Dawn engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, it terminated William's maintenance obligation from the date he filed his petition and ordered Dawn to reimburse William for the overpayment.

On appeal, Dawn argues that the trial court erred in terminating her maintenance because William failed to prove that she and Jaime engaged in a continuing, conjugal relationship.

Illinois law provides for termination of maintenance when there is a resident, continuing, conjugal relationship between the maintenance recipient and a third party. 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1998). To prove a continuing, conjugal relationship, an ex-spouse must show that the former spouse is involved in a de facto husband and wife relationship. In re Marriage of Leming, 227 Ill. App.3d 154, 590 N.E.2d 1027 (1992). To determine if such a relationship exists, courts have examined the following factors: (1) the length of the relationship; (2) the amount of time the couple spends together; (3) the nature of activities engaged in; (4) the interrelation of their personal affairs; (5) whether they vacation together; and (6) whether they spend holidays together. In re the Marriage of Herrin, 262 Ill. App.3d 573, 634 N.E.2d 1168 (1994). A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court's factual findings because the trial court stands in the best position to weigh the credibility of all the witnesses. In re Jones, 285 Ill. App.3d 8, 673 N.E.2d 703 (1996). Finally, a court of review will not reverse a trial court's finding concerning the existence of a de facto relationship unless that finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.In re Marriage of Caradonna, 197 Ill. App.3d 155, 553 N.E.2d 1161 (1990).

Here, Dawn and Jaime lived together for a year and a half. They socialized together frequently and engaged in such dating activities as dinners, movies, and drinks. Although Dawn testified that they did not have a sexual relationship, we defer to the trial court's finding that Jaime's account of their sexual relationship was more credible. They exchanged Christmas and birthday presents. They split household chores, and they socialized with Dawn's friends. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that the trial court's finding of a de facto husband-wife relationship between Dawn and Jaime was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly found a continual, conjugal relationship between Dawn and Jaime and granted William's petition to terminate maintenance.

On cross-appeal, William argues that the trial court erred in terminating maintenance from the date of his petition rather than the date the cohabitation began. In support of his contention, he cites to In re Marriage of Gray, 314 Ill. App.3d 249, 731 N.E.2d 942 (2000). InGray, the appellate court held that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjugal cohabitation began and not when the petition to terminate maintenance is filed. Gray, 314 Ill. App.3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946 (2000). In response, Dawn argues that the terms of the settlement agreement that "maintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of the court" is a separate agreement between the parties that precludes application of the "conjugal cohabitation" section of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act). In the alternative, Dawn contends that the Gray case fails to follow well settled Illinois law.

Section 510(c) of the (Act) provides as follows:

"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party, or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance, or if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis." 750 ILCS 5/510 (c) (West 1998).

We reject Dawn's argument that the terms of the settlement agreement constitute a separate agreement which only allows maintenance to be terminated upon completion of payment or the entry of a court order. We do not read that section as limiting the termination of maintenance to only those two instances. Therefore, we find that the "conjugal cohabitation" section of the Act applies in this case. Further, we agree with In re Marriage of Gray that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjugal cohabitation began and not when the petition to terminate maintenance is filed. Gray, 314 Ill. App.3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946 (2000). Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in terminating William's maintenance obligations from the time he filed his petition. Accordingly, we remand this cause for the trial court to determine when Dawn began the cohabitation and to terminate her payments as of that date.

The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and remanded in part.

Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

BRESLIN and McDADE, J.J., concur.

IN RE MARRIAGE OF SNOW