ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, she was fully advised of her constitutional and statutory rights. Her admission was therefore knowingly and intelligently made (see, Family Ct Act — 321.3; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238; Matter of Brian K. J., 223 A.D.2d 643). It is clear from the allocution that all of the elements of the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree were established (see, Penal Law — 140.10[a]; People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404, 409; Matter of Luis C., 66 Misc.2d 907, 912). The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in ordering the disclosure of the appellant's hospital records pertaining to two hospitalizations for alcohol abuse, as those records were clearly relevant to its determination as to her appropriate placement. The Family Court's finding of good cause is supported by the record (see, 42 U.S.C. — 290dd-2[b][2][C]; 42 C.F.R. § 2.64[d]; Matter of Maximo M., 186 Misc.2d 266; Matter of Doe Children, 93 Misc.2d 479). The appellant's contention that she was deprived of her right to a speedy disposition hearing is unpreserved for appellate review (see, Matter of Michael P., 213 A.D.2d 717; Matter of Eugene S., 200 A.D.2d 574) and, in any event, is without merit (see, Family Ct Act — 350.1; Matter of Douglas L., 232 A.D.2d 489; Matter of Perry O., 232 A.D.2d 225; Matter of Eddie M., 196 A.D.2d 25).
RITTER, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.