ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
"Every court retains a continuing jurisdiction generally to reconsider any prior intermediate determination it has made" during the pendency of an action (Aridas v. Caserta, 41 N.Y.2d 1059, 1061; see, Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 20; Matter of Estate of Burns, 228 A.D.2d 674). Therefore, the Supreme Court did not offend the doctrine of the law of the case when it reconsidered its prior ruling as to whether the proceeding was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The original letter to the petitioner from the Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York (hereinafter the Chancellor), dated April 8, 1998, advised the petitioner that his probationary status was terminated effective "as of the close of business on May 1, 1998". Because a determination to terminate probationary employment becomes final and binding on the date the termination becomes effective (see, Matter of Frasier v. Board of Educ., 71 N.Y.2d 763, 766-767; Matter of Bonilla v. Board of Educ., A.D.2d [decided herewith]; Matter of Mateo v. Board of Educ., A.D.2d [decided herewith]; Matter of Levine v. Board of Educ., 272 A.D.2d 328, Matter of Persico v. Board of Educ., 220 A.D.2d 512, 513, Matter of DeMilio v. Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216; see also, Matter of McCain v. Fernandez, 226 A.D.2d 380; Matter of Schulman v. Board of Educ., 184 A.D.2d 643), the petition filed on July 30, 1999, is clearly time-barred (see, CPLR 217).
In light of our determination we need not reach the petitioner's remaining contentions.
SANTUCCI, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, H. MILLER and CRANE, JJ., concur.