Defendant was arrested after being stopped at a roadblock. As developed at the suppression hearing, the People's witnesses asserted that the roadblock was established for varying reasons, stating that the relevant geographic area was plagued by a recent increase in crime that included taxi/livery robberies, carjackings, and violent crimes such as shootings, homicides, and assaults. At another juncture, it was indicated that the roadblock was established to suppress crime generally, although, according to at least one witness's Grand Jury testimony, the roadblock was established to conduct a safety inspection for licenses and vehicle registrations.
According to the People, the roadblock at issue was constitutionally permissible because its primary purpose was aimed at detecting carjackings and taxi/livery robberies. Assuming, without deciding, that the use of roadblocks for such purposes is not precluded by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond ( 531 U.S. 32) [general interest in crime control insufficient to support suspicionless stops], suppression is nevertheless required.
In meeting their initial burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of the seizure, the People were obligated, inter alia, to demonstrate the gravity of the public concern that would be served by the roadblock (see, Matter of Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d 136, 142, cert denied U.S. 121 S.Ct. 643; People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 525). Although, as noted, the People's witnesses testified that the relevant locality suffered from an increase in various crimes, they offered only generalized assertions to support this claim (cf., Matter of Muhammad F., supra; People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, cert denied 459 U.S. 1010). This was insufficient to meet their initial burden. In view of the foregoing, we do not reach defendant's remaining contentions.