ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint is granted, upon searching the record, the defendants' cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint is granted, so much of the order as denied the cross motion is vacated, and the complaint is dismissed.
In 1980 the plaintiffs contracted to purchase certain property located within the Village of Sag Harbor, subject to their application for a use variance being granted. In May 1981, their application was granted, subject to certain conditions, and in 1982, the plaintiffs consummated the purchase of the property. In 1989, however, the plaintiffs commenced this action claiming, inter alia, that certain of the conditions imposed in 1981 were confiscatory and arbitrary. Certain neighboring residents, including the appellants, were granted permission to intervene as defendants. Thereafter, they moved, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. The defendants cross-moved, inter alia, for the same relief. The Supreme Court denied the motion and the cross motion, and 10 of the intervenors appealed. We reverse. We agree with the appellants that the plaintiffs' action, which challenges a 1981 determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Sag Harbor, is time-barred (see, CPLR 217; Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229-230).
Moreover, although generally "an appellate court's reversal or modification of a judgment as to an appealing party will not inure to the benefit of a nonappealing coparty" (Hecht v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 57, 61-62), this case presents one of those rare occasions in which the grant of full relief to the appealing parties necessarily entails granting relief to nonappealing parties (see, Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 277-278).
SANTUCCI, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, S. MILLER and FRIEDMANN, JJ., concur.