RONALD L. WALKER, Chief Justice
We write here to clarify a point raised by the State and the amicus in their briefs on motion for rehearing. The State and amicus argue that the legislative intent of the statute is not as we stated in footnote 4 of our opinion. See In the Matter of Q.D.M., 45 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet. h.). We believe the State has taken our passing observation of perceived "legislative intent" contained in footnote 4 to mean much more than we intended.
As we stated in our opinion, in statutory construction we begin with the language of the statute; if the language is clear, it is not for the judiciary to add to or subtract from the statute. Id. at 800; Miller v. State, 33 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In Tune v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex. 2000), the court stated as follows: "[Reviewing courts] must enforce the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of construction or other extrinsic aid to construe it." See also RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. 1985) ("Unless a statute is ambiguous, we must follow the clear language of the statute.").
Here, we enforce the clear language and plain meaning of section 54.05(j). A requirement for a third adjudication is found in the language of the statute itself. The statute requires that "the adjudications" (the plural of "adjudication" meaning "at least two") occur after the date of "another previous adjudication." The sum of "[a]t least two" plus "another previous" equals three.
We overrule the State's motion for rehearing.
MOTION FOR REHEARING DENIED.